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Bates and Goodman (1999) represent a “unified lexicalist” approach to grammar, arguing that both 
grammar and the lexicon are subserved by the same domain-general learning mechanism, and further, 
that grammar “emerges” from the lexicon. Plunkett and Marchman’s work on past tense formation 
(1991, 1993), improving upon the modeling techniques of Rumelhart and McClelland (1986), 
exemplifies a unified lexicalist approach. By abandoning the more traditional dual-mechanism 
approach (Chomsky & Halle, 1968; Chomsky, 1968, 1986, 1988; Pinker, 1994, 1999; Pinker & 
Prince 1988, 1994), unified lexicalists aim to provide a more plausible account of child language 
acquisition beyond the rote-leaming phase. Pinker (1999), in the spirit of the Pinker & Prince (1988, 
1994), repudiates the unified lexicalist approach, however, on grounds that single mechanisms model 
the acquisition of regular and irregular morphology inaccurately. Results of psychological studies 
such as the “wug” test (Gleason, 1958; Pinker, 1999) suggest that the transition to the system- 
building phase (Stage 2 in the u-shaped learning process) is largely underdetermined in the unified 
account. It is argued that unified lexicalists fail to (i) offer a coherent definition of “emergence” and 
(ii) adequately clarify how, or by what mechanism(s), grammar can properly be said to emerge from 
the lexicon. On the other hand, it is argued that Pinker fails to (i) provide a clear account of that 
which is “instinctual” about the dual mechanism when it comes to regular and irregular morphology, 
(ii) address the improvements made by conncctionists on the single mechanism model, and (iii) 
explain how his higher-level psychological theory can be implemented at the lower neurological level 
(without appeal to a connectionist “abstract neurology”). In a more comprehensive approach to the 
emergence of regular and irregular past tense, one that operates on different levels of analysis 
(psychological versus neurological), both single- and dual-mechanism accounts hold indispensable 
pieces of the explanatory puzzle.
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1.0 The Issue:
A Martian scientist, landing on earth to perform a taxonomy o f its species, would 
rightly conclude that there is something unique to the system of communication used by 
humans. The grammatical structure of human language renders it distinct from all other 
instances of animal communication. Only human language reveals such combinatorial, 
exponential, and recursive (Pinker, 1999: 1-19) power, or “generativity.” What causally 
determines the grammatical structure of human language is one of the most fundamental 
questions concerning linguistics of the 21st century.
Linguistics of the late 1950s, fueled by the revolutionary work of Noam Chomsky, 
was compelled to the view that a grammar module, operating according to innate 
grammatical principles, accounts for the structure of human language. On Chomsky’s 
view, the structure of language is essentially hard-wired, or built into the brain. Our 
biogenetic endowment ensures a domain-specific mechanism, a “mental organ,” which is 
dedicated to the acquisition of grammatical rules. The grammar module is a highly 
systematic—indeed, productive—cogvüXxvQ mechanism. The lexicon, by contrast, is 
considered to be the repository of the arbitrary (e.g. Chomsky & Halle, 1968).
In the mid-1980s, an alternative to the classical nativist/empiricist dichotomy began 
to take shape, what is referred to as “emergentism.” On the emergentist view, the 
structure of language is largely self-organized (from both evolutionary and developmental 
standpoints), resulting from conservative genetic interaction with a structured world. 
Humans are biogenetically endowed with non-linguistic, general cognitive mechanisms, 
and the rate at which these mechanisms develop actually acts as a constraint on language
1
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acquisition and systemization. Linguistic structure is thus a by-product o f maturational 
constraints on the development o f non-linguistic cognitive mechanisms, and lexical 
processes accomplished by a general cognitive mechanism which detects regularities in the 
input. Rules of grammar are generalized over these regularities, emerging as distributed, 
“virtual” representations, not as explicit unconscious representations (as it is often put) 
inherent in the brain’s architecture.
Allegiance to Chomsky’s approach is nevertheless still pervasive. It seems the 
dominant paradigm in linguistics today, although gradually shifting, retains some 
fundamental nativist assumptions (e.g. innate knowledge of language, domain-specificity, 
genetic determinism). Pinker (1999), for instance, holds that the structure of language is 
primarily generated by grammar, or by a “rule” module; further, this module operates 
according to (putatively) innate principles. Although Pinker dissents from Chomsky and 
Halle’s treatment of the irregulars (see “Rules All the Way Down” section), he concurs 
with them on one fundamental point: linguistic structure is most significantly determined 
by a language-specific cognitive organ, the microcircuitry of which has been “hard-wired,” 
or prespecified in the genome (though not necessarily directly prespecified, see “Unified 
Lexicalist,” “Convergent Model, ” and “Discussion” sections). Our biogenetic endowment 
ensures a complete modular separation between lexical and grammatical processes (i.e. 
between “words”and “rules”). The question concerning nativists and emergentists alike is 
whether the structure o f language is determined by a domain-5/?ec//;c module, dedicated to 
the acquisition of grammatical rules, or by ûomdim-gemral cognitive mechanisms.
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1.1 The Models:
Chomsky and Halle (1968) treat irregular and regular morphology as a highly 
lawful, rule-bound enterprise, in which most regular and irregular changes boil down to a 
small handful of “austere” grammatical rules. For example, the past tense changes of 
nearly 165 irregular verbs are handled by only three phonological rules (Chomsky and 
Halle, 1968; also Pinker 1999: 92-4). Chomsky and Halle thus present a “rules all the way 
down” dual-mechanism model. One mechanism, a robust grammar module including at 
least one sub-module for phonological processes, generates infinite structure according to 
explicit unconscious rules, while the other mechanism, the lexicon, is finite, variable, and 
more or less discontinuous. (See figure 1.)
Pinker (1999), though, departs from Chomsky and Halle’s view that irregular 
verbs are handled by explicit unconscious rules. Pinker presents an alternative model of 
irregular past tense formation, in which irregulars are mediated by a parallel distributed 
processor, or a pattern associator memory. The pattern associator produces rule-Me 
behavior (stem-stem and change-change structures), but only according to local processes 
of association, not according to explicit unconscious rules. Pinker thus presents a dual­
mechanism model, in which irregulars are handled by a pattern associator and regulars by 
a “rule” module (a symbol processor). Pinker posits an innately constrained, hard-wired 
“blocking mechanism” to account for much of the success children have with past tense 
formation toward the end of system-building phase and throughout the fine-tuning phase 
(Stage 3 in the U-shaped learning pattern). (See figure 2.)
Bates and Goodman (1999), Plunkett and Marchman (1993), and Rumelhart and
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McClelland (1986) all contribute evidence for language’s emergence. Elements from the 
work o f each of these scholars represents a third approach to modeling regular and 
irregular past tense formation—the emergent approach. Bates and Goodman (1999), for 
instance, argue that grammar “emerges” from the developmental and mechanical processes 
of a single, general cognitive device (modeled by Rumelhart and McClelland and Plunkett 
and Marchman for past tense formation). Bates, Goodman, Rumelhart, McClelland, 
Plunkett, and Marchman all entertain some version of the single mechanism model, in 
which linguistic structure is an emergent by-product of maturational constraints and the 
inherent processes of associative memory (i .e. pattern association). Emergentism is 
informed by state-of-the-art research being done in human genetic mapping (the Human 
Genome Project), evolutionary biology, developmental psychology, and computer science.
(See figure 3.)
2.0 Unified Lexicalism;
From their title, “On the Emergence of Grammar from the Lexicon,” Bates and 
Goodman (1999) make it clear that their theory of how children come to perform complex 
grammatical operations departs from traditional empiricist (Aristotle—>Locke—>Skinner) 
and nativist (Plato—>Descartes->Chomsky) views. Bates and Goodman attempt to place 
the nature-nurture debate on a novel playing field, preserving elements of both extremist 
views, and departing from other problematic claims. But how exactly should we 
characterize this departure? On the empiricist view, children learn how to use language 
with general learning mechanisms and the help of explicit training (also “on analogy,” via
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
“generalization,” or even by way of “operant conditioning” in behaviorist terms), rather 
than knowledge of language somehow being encoded in the genome. Empiricists, then, 
believe that grammar is learned bottom-up, through inductive learning accomplished by 
mechanisms similar to (if not the same as) ones we use to learn how to tie our shoes, 
mentally rotate images, succeed at Magic Eye, direct our attention, store information, and 
generalize over past experience. Nativists, by contrast, emphasize top-down acquisition of 
knowledge of language; that is, to a considerable extent KOL is thought to be present at 
birth, children having been biogenetically endowed (e.g. by natural selection or physical 
law) with a domdm-specific (i.e. for grammar proper) mechanism (or “mental organ”) that 
operates according to built-in principles (Chomsky, 1986, 1995).
Bates and Goodman’s notion of emergentism, specifically with regard to the 
emergence of grammar from the lexicon, departs from traditional empiricism because it 
entails some version of the biological endowment argument (e.g. chronotopic innateness; 
see Elman, 1999), albeit a toned-down version. Emergentists admit that our biological 
endowment of wow-linguistic mechanisms used in language computations constrains 
language acquisition. “Learning plays a central role but does so within biological 
constraints” (Bates & Goodman, 1999: 31). It is not the case that we bring a “blank slate” 
to the task of language acquisition; rather, acquisition occurs in a complex synergy 
between biogenetic constraints (on the development of domain-general mechanisms) and 
environmental constraints like the structure of the input. Grammatical abilities are thought 
to be spawned indirectly from genetic specification. Bates and Goodman depart from the 
nativist tradition, however, arguing that grammar is mediated by domain-^ewera/ learning
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
mechanisms; in fact, grammar emerges out of the lexicon, which itself is a product of 
general cognition. With these departures from both empiricism and nativism, emergentism 
denotes a “genuine third alternative” (31). Bates and Goodman leave the “toning-down of 
the innateness claim” project to other researchers (Elman, 1996, 1999), and primarily take 
issue with the nativist claim of domain-specificity.
My view is that domain-specificity is an untenable claim at the implementational 
(neural) level. In light of current findings in genetics and neuroscience, it is implausible 
that our biogenetic endowment would specify precisely that class of stimuli which neural 
“language” mechanisms can serve. Even if humans are limited to the use of domain- 
general cognitive mechanisms throughout early ontogenesis (1-4 years o f age), it is not 
necessary to view general cognition as an unconstrained monolith—entirely open-ended— 
with no sub-mechanisms or sub-layers*. The proposal is that we can have a “modular” 
theory (in the strict sense o f multi-layered processing), yet simultaneously retain the claim 
to domain-generality (and thus, emergence). The single/dual mechanism characterization 
of past tense models does not map directly onto the domain-generality/domain-specificity 
distinction. Modularity effects detected as early as age 3 (e.g. in past tense formation, see 
Kim et al., 1994) might, in fact, be signs that two different general cognitive sub-layers, or 
mechanisms, are beginning to dissociate, each subserving a more specialized general 
cognitive function (e.g. rapid versus attended categorization of stimuli). By no means, 
though, do we have to rely upon direct genetic constraints to ensure these effects. Even 
Bates and Goodman admit that modularization is a normal aspect of ontogenesis (1999:
* Newport et. al (1999), for example, find evidence for an innate statistical learning mechanism, but this is a
6
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64). Nevertheless, modularity effects are the outcome of development, not its cause.
Bates and Goodman propose a “unified lexicalist” (37) approach to grammar in the
spirit o f Goldberg (1999). The unified lexicalist approach to grammar’s emergence stands
in direct opposition to nativist approaches that posit domain-specificity.
Most nativists concede that the lexicon is finite, varies markedly over languages, 
and must be learned (at least in part) through brute-force [bottom-up] inductive 
procedures that are also used for other forms of learning, linguistic and non- 
linguistic... [But] Because core grammar is universal, functionally opaque, and 
infinitively generative, the domain-general procedures that are used to acquire 
words cannot (it is argued) work for the acquisition and processing of grammar. 
(Bates and Goodman, 37)
If grammar cannot be learned bottom-up, then grammatical and lexical development must
unfold on independent developmental pathways (Chomsky, 1986; Pinker, 1994, 1999;
Ouhalla, 1999). Both nativists and Bates and Goodman would agree that lexical learning
utilizes general cognitive mechanisms. The heart o f the debate is whether grammar
(putatively domain-specific) shares an interface with the lexicon (i.e. in the sense o f two
separate modules sharing information via a mediating mechanism), or, on the other hand,
whether it emerges from the lexicon (i.e. is subserved by the same domain-general
mechanism as the lexicon). If grammar and the lexicon turn out to be separate modules,
we have no grounds for claiming that grammar “emerges” from general learning
mechanisms. Contrarily, if general learning mechanisms are all children bring to the task
of language acquisition, we must re-evaluate the fundamentals of generative linguistics in
general. We could no longer hold the view that grammar is determined by “knowledge of
component of general cognition.
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language” (Chomsky, 1986), present in our brains, instead, grammar would be determined 
by “knowledge of linguists,” and their descriptive vocabulary.
In certain atypical populations (e.g. brain damaged patients with localized lesions), 
nativists look for a double dissociation between grammatical and lexical proficiency as 
evidence that domain-specific structures in the brain subserve these two different types of 
operations, or in any case, that the same mechanism does not subserve both. For example, 
if grammatical proficiency after brain trauma remains stable while lexical proficiency or 
general learning plummets, this is an indication that grammar and the lexicon are mediated 
by separate mechanisms. If, in a different population, grammatical proficiency after brain 
trauma plummets while general learning remains intact, this is even further evidence that 
we have two separate mechanisms at work. Thus, nativists would clearly not agree with 
Bates and Goodman that the lexicon and grammar are “unified” in a strong sense^. Bates 
and Goodman provide evidence that the lexicon and grammar are inextricably tied 
throughout childhood (1-3 years old) in normal populations, citing a strong correlation 
between grammatical scores on parental reports/proficiency tests and lexical tallies, so 
strong that an assessment of lexical proficiency is the best available predictor o f later 
grammatical proficiency. Never do grammatical skills outstrip lexical skills, even into the 
“very heart of grammatical development” (46), between age 3 and 3 .5, when normally 
developing children can produce most of the elementary syntactic structures o f their 
language (passives, relative clauses, etc.). In abnormal populations (late/early talkers.
^Current generative linguistics (e.g. Chomsky’s iniiiimalist program, 1995) focuses on how Universal 
Grammar (UG) accesses the lexicon, so clearly there is thought to be some exchange of information at an 
interface, but this exchange only occurs at the interface (otherwise the mechanisms are autonomous).
8
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children with brain lesions, Williams syndrome. Down syndrome. Specific Language 
Impairment), apparent dissociations, or even double dissociations, are either non-existent 
within the 1-3 age bracket, or result from woM-linguistic deficits.
The only two cases of clear dissociation, that o f DNS and SLI, can be traced to 
acoustic deficits, which themselves (coupled with other non-linguistic impairments) 
account for differences in vocabulary size and grammatical complexity. DNS individuals, 
for example, exhibit significant impairment o f auditory short-term memory compared to 
WMS individuals, though they score significantly better than WMS patients on visual 
short-term memory tasks (Wang & Bellugi, 1994). The DNS sample’s auditory deficit, in 
conjunction with other general cognitive deficits (low IQ, 40-60), account for the fact that 
DNS vocabulary and grammar skills dissociate, while WMS scores reveal no such 
dissociation.
Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising the DNS individuals are 
selectively impaired in the ability to detect, store, and retrieve those aspects of 
their linguistic input that are lowest in phonological salience (as Leonard,
Bortolini, Caselli, McGregor, & Sabbadini, 1992, reported for children with SLI) 
and lowest in visual imagery (as Goodglass & Menn, 1985, reported for adults 
with Broca’s aphasia). (Bates & Goodman, 1999: 62)
To date, no population—normal or abnormal—exhibits a dissociation of grammatical and
lexical proficiency that can be traced to impairment of a domain-specific grammar module,
as Pinker (1991) suggests for DNS individuals.
Bates and Goodman are careful to draw a distinction between domain-specificity
and localization (65). A certain function can be “localized” (i.e. mediated routinely by the
same region in the brain) and simultaneously attend to other classes of stimuli (e.g. non-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
linguistic stimuli). Bates and Goodman concede that localization effects might lead to 
modularity later in life, but not during the formative years of child language acquisition 
(64). The flaw in Bates and Goodman’s argument is that from a correlation between test 
scores in their data (MLU, GDI, etc.), they infer that “the acquisition and neural 
representation of grammar and the lexicon are accomplished by domain-general 
mechanisms” (39). Few nativists, neither Pinker nor Chomsky, for example, nor 
emergentists demanding an account of the mechanisms whereby grammar “emerges,” 
would accept this leap from correlation to causation.
Bates and Goodman’s evidence (a strong lexicon/grammar correlation across 
normal populations and a lack of dissociation in atypical populations) can actually be 
accommodated by the nativist approach. As Bates and Goodman themselves recognize, 
“correlation is not [common] cause” (43). Even if we grant that lexical and grammatical 
proficiency are reliable predictors of each other cross-linguistically, we can only say that a 
dissociation “seem[s] to require” a “separate neural system for grammar” (67), and 
conversely, that a strong correlation is evidence only that the lexicon and grammar seem to 
be mediated by the same domain-general mechanism. The same evidence could be seen in 
an entirely different light. From the nativist’s perspective, all the evidence shows is that 
the development of two independent proficiencies (lexical and grammatical) is highly 
correlated. This would make perfect sense for the nativist because the lexicon and 
grammar are thought to share an interface with one another which propels language 
acquisition into and beyond the first word combination stage (18-20 months). Syntax 
must have some way of accessing semantics, especially after 18-20 months. Bates and
10
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Goodman’s faulty assumption is that nativist accounts necessarily presuppose a "hard” 
dissociation. Bates and Goodman might be mistaking the operation of a syntax-semantics 
interface, which would reveal a strong lexicon/grammar correlation, as the operation of 
syntax proper. Even a generative nativist (not that these two characterizations are 
necessarily coextensive) would recognize a lawful correlation between grammar and the 
lexicon at the syntax-semantics interface (e.g. Chomsky, 1968, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1995).
Bates and Goodman claim that grammar “emerges” from the lexicon, but without 
violating their own principle, they cannot provide an adequate account as to what this 
means, or how (by what mechanism) emergence occurs, so their use of the term rings with 
“spookiness,” or at least underdeveloped hypotheses. As such, emergence in Bates and 
Goodman’s sense is only a thumb nail sketch of a “genuine third alternative.” Bates and 
Goodman provide a number of examples of emergent outcomes, representing the specific 
senses o f non-predictability, self-organization, and so on, but they never explain what the 
“emergence of grammar from the lexicon” means, aside from the reticent suggestion that 
lexical and grammatical processing “seem to be” mediated by the same domain-general 
learning mechanism. This problem of vagueness is not only terminological, indicative of 
an inadequate or incoherent definition of “emergence”; even worse, it is substantive, 
indicative of an inadeqaute account of the mechanisms whereby grammar emerges. Part 
o f my project, then, is to formulate a definition of grammar’s emergence in terms of non­
predictability, self-organization, and non-additivity, thereby rendering the implicit 
connections in the analogies (honeycomb, giraffe’s neck, ram’s horn, and bubbles) explicit. 
My role is to de-mystify Bates and Goodman’s use of the term “emergence,” by providing
1 1
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a mechanistic account of the emergence of grammar (in specific, an account of the 
grammatical structures involved with past tense).
Nevertheless, without more definitive evidence, whether lexical and grammatical 
development occur on the same or on different pathways remains unanswerable. The 
evidence that Bates and Goodman offers might be regarded as dubious, moreover, for a 
number of methodological reasons (see “Problems” section). Another part o f my project 
is to make clear that the possibility o f Bates and Goodman’s proposal (domain-generality) 
being generalized to explain cross-linguistic data is largely an open-ended empirical 
question. Either we can dig in the trenches looking for evidence for a structured lexicon 
(e.g. for prototypical light Vs and the grammatical features they encode; Goldberg, 1999) 
or for strong enough constraints on grammar’s emergence (Elman, 1999), or we can take 
the view that we need to look at specific grammatical operations and determine what kind 
of neural mechanisms these operations require (e.g. serial vs. parallel processors; Pinker, 
1999),
It is possible that grammar and the lexicon are, in fact, modularized, though not 
altogether informationally encapsulated, and implemented in very different types of neural 
architecture. The “almost lawful” correlation could in fact be a result of the independent 
but simultaneous development of two interfaced modules, especially in light of the fact 
that both lexical and grammatical operations must be performed for the production 
(/comprehension) of phrases and early sentences (i.e. beyond 18 months). When we look 
at specific grammatical operations (e.g. regular and irregular past tense formation; Pinker, 
1999), “words” and “rules” appear to be implemented in very different neural processors.
12
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It is an unnecessary move, though, to take the further step and claim that grammar is 
representaiionally innate (Elman, 1996, 1999), but I think that most nativists would avoid 
this obvious blunder.
Nowhere in the nativist literature (Chomsky, 1956, 1986, 1988; Pinker, 1989, 
1994, 1999) is a claim made for representational innateness to the extent Elman (1999) 
proposes (i.e. to the extent that KOL is directly encoded in the genome, that the genome 
prespecifies all relevant synaptic connections for UG’s implementation). One of the 
criticisms brought to bear on Pinker (this paper) focuses on his failure to clarify how 
certain genes ensure the wiring scheme that implements KOL. Vagueness is ultimately 
Pinker's downfall, though in this case, it at least prevents him from being mis-categorized. 
The representationally innate position, as sketched by Elman, is a straw-man position, and 
when we throw this option out as a possible explanation of what nativists have in mind, 
we are left with a toned-down version of innateness, just a shade stronger than the 
emergentists’. Still, a shade’s difference could mean all the difference in this debate. 
Chomsky (1986, 1988) and Pinker (1994) suggest that certain genes code for domain- 
specific linguistic (non-lexical) mechanisms; whereas Bates/Goodman and Elman (1999) 
suggest that certain genes code for Aovcmn-general mechanisms which get used 
throughout development for linguistic processing (and perhaps other non-linguistic 
processing), and that the maturational schedule of these mechanisms actually acts as a 
constraint on child language learning.
2.1 “Emergence” for Bates and Goodman:
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Bates and Goodman provide many examples of emergence (32-35), but the 
“bubble” analogy is their first. The spherical shape of bubbles is accomplished not because 
something in the bubbles necessitates this structure, but because it is the “only possible 
solution to achieving maximum volume with minimum surface area” (32). The 
mathematic law governing volume/surface area relations limits the architectural 
possibilities to a single outcome. So long as soap and water come together (and basic 
environmental conditions are met), this brute fact about the world stands in the way of 
bubbles taking on alternative shapes (e.g. triangles or diamonds), and thus constrains them 
into adopting the spherical design solution. This is an example of self-organizing design, 
in the sense that the structure of bubbles is not prespecified in any of the properties of 
soap and water. Bubbles find themselves in a spherical shape time and time again because 
the world provides no other possible solution. The soap and water blindly follow local 
constraints (i.e. mathematical facts about the world) and the outcome of sphericalness 
emerges.
Insofar as language is concerned, grammar “emerges” for Bates and Goodman 
from interactions between lexical processes (/development) and a structured world—in this 
case, the structure of the input. Bates and Goodman align themselves with Bates and 
MacWhinney (1989), espousing the view that grammar (/logic) emerges because the 
possible design solutions to the problem of mapping a rich set of meanings onto a limited 
speech channel are constrained by limits of memory, perception, and motor planning (see 
p. 33; also Elman, 1999). These limitations (memory, perception, motor planning) are, of 
course, governed by innate maturational constraints (our “internal clock” during
14
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ontogenesis); other innate constraints (e.g. unit, local, and global level architectural 
constraints) on now-linguistic organs also play a role in simplifying the mapping problem. 
This is precisely where Bates and Goodman’s view departs from traditional empiricism 
{indirect prespecification), because the solution to the mapping problem is not derived 
from learning alone. On the emergentist view, though, grammar is not genetic “all the 
way down” (i.e. not directly, or representationally), but emerges from conservative genetic 
interaction (genes coding for non-linguistic mechanisms like memory according to a 
chronotopically innate schedules) with a structured environment. It is not entirely a fact 
about the genes that kids possess knowledge of language, but a fact about the way the 
world hangs together, and how this “hanging together” constrains certain outcomes. On 
the emergentist view, then, grammar is to a large extent self-organizing.
To summarize: emergentists emphasize the way seemingly domain-specific 
structures are generated as by-products of processes occurring in other domains, 
processes which are essentially myopic to the overall plan or output. Linguistic structure 
is not causally tied to a genetically prespecified, domain-specific language organ, but to (i) 
conservative genetic interaction (e.g. “timing constraints” on the maturational schedule of 
memory which elicit the “less is more” effect, see Newport, 1990 & Elman, 1999) 
governing the development o f mechanisms within the domain of general cognition, (ii) the 
inherent processes of associative memory (see “Single Mechanism” section) and other 
general cognitive mechanisms (e.g. see Newport, 1999), and (iii) structural regularities in 
the input (environmental).
Bates and Goodman also refer to emergence as non-predictability: “outcomes can
15
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arise for reasons that are not obvious or predictable from any of the individual inputs into 
the problem [e.g. soap, water, etc.]” (32), but they would probably agree (to avoid occult 
forces) that once you do have a mechanistic account of all the relevant constraints which 
govern, for example, soap-environment, soap-water, water-environment interactions, you 
can predict how the lower level needs to be “fixed” in order to produce the higher-level 
phenomenon (i.e. spherical bubbles). Emergence as non-predictability, for Bates and 
Goodman, is thus an epistemological form of emergence, characterizing what we 
presently do not know about configuring the lower-level properties of the lexicon and 
meeting basic environmental conditions to compel grammar’s emergence (i.e. to account 
mechanistically for grammar’s emergence in terms of maturational constraints; Newport, 
1990 & Elman, 1999, as well as other general cognitive constraints, Gupta & Dell, 1999, 
Newport et a l , 1999, and so on). The chore, which Bates and Goodman fail to 
adequately do in this article, is to explicate the lower level mechanisms that facilitate 
grammar’s emergence. We should be careful not to let any “pinches of magic” into our 
account and assume that we could never uncover the relevant constraints governing 
grammar (or bubble formation). In fact, we are well on our way to uncovering the 
relevant constraints when it comes to grammar, and considerable progress has already 
been made.
Bates and Goodman add to their running definition of emergence that the spherical 
form of bubbles is “not explained by the soap, the water, or the little boy who blows the 
bubble,” which indicates a sense of non-additivity, that is, that the whole (the spherical 
shape) is not just the sum of its parts (soap, water, etc.). The outcome in emergent
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processes is not prespecified in any individual property or input to the problem. All 
inputs, plus constraints in the world, account for the bubble’s emergence. So for language 
(specifically past tense), the relevant constraints are as follows: the architecture and 
developmental rate of lexicon, which is itself constrained by the architecture and 
developmental rate of whatever general learning mechanisms subserve it (see also the “less 
is more” hypothesis; Newport, 1990); the structure of the input (e.g. ratio of regular to 
irregular past tense forms), and the regularities occurring therewith; social factors (Snow, 
1999), for example, the fact that kids are innately constrained to attract and engage in 
social interaction in general; innate «o^i-linguistic mechanisms used for linguistic tasks 
(Newport et al., 1999); and language itself, co-evolving with our brains, “shifting” due to 
evolutionary pressures to make it assimilate more readily into the brains of our children 
(Deacon, 1997). A complex synergy involving all factors is what “fixes,” or forces the 
outcome of child language acquisition. Unlike non-predictability, non-additivity is not an 
epistemological claim about what we currently do not know about fixing the lower-level 
properties, but a claim about how the outcome (grammatical structure) is generated. 
Grammar, as non-additive, is not a direct result of a grammar module’s inherent 
architecture and developmental rate, but an indirect by-product of all these forces doing 
their own local jobs (each being more or less “dumb” to the other’s job or to some plan of 
design).
Extending the analogy, grammatical representations are not defined by a 
prespecified “blueprint” o f neural microcircuitry mediating UG (again, this claim is largely 
left for other researchers to haggle over, e.g. Elman 1999), nor can grammatical
17
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processing be traced to a ûomzLm-specific module (this is the central issue for Bates and
Goodman). Even in cases of SLI, where specifically linguistic operations are affected,
there is no need to invoke the independent development hypothesis (that language-specific
and general learning mechanisms develop on separate pathways). It is equally (if not
more) feasible to consider «ow-linguistic factors in SLI.
Children with SLI score significantly below age-matched controls on at least some 
non-linguistic measures, including mental imagery and mental rotation (Johnson 
1994), symbolic play (Thai & Katich 1996), and shifting attention (Townsend, 
Wulfeck, Nichols, & Koch 1995). Tallal and her associates proposed that specific 
vulnerability of morphology is a by-product of a subtle deficit in the ability to 
perceive rapid temporal sequences of auditory stimuli. (B&G, 63)
From the developmental perspective, a perceptual, acoustic, or general cognitive
deficiency (or all three) early on could lead to large-scale changes in the outcome (i.e. to
SLI). What would traditionally be called performance constraints affect SLI patients’
competence, or at least hamper the grammar module from reaching whatever threshold of
input it requires to “turn on” its innate mechanism (in other words, for kids to hone in on
the appropriate rules for the appropriate language).
As a by-product of interactions among three non-linguistic factors, SLI is itself a
sort of “emergent,” self-organized outcome. There is no need to posit a single, damaged
gene (or set of genes) which codes for the precise wiring of the inflectional system, and
what follows, that SLI is thus a direct genetic outcome. The genes involved in the disease
are not dedicated to prespecifying an inflectional “blueprint,” and probably serve either
directly or indirectly in a multitude of different functions, many of which are general
cognitive functions (see “Discussion” section-multifunctional genes). Genetic impairment
18
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in SLI does not directly shut down the production of a morphology network in the brain. 
It does shut down, or at least impair, various general cognitive mechanisms (the acoustic 
system, attention directing or attention sustaining systems, mechanisms involved in mental 
imaging, etc.), and this, in turn, shuts down the production of a mature inflectional system. 
If  the acoustic system is impaired, SLI patients would find it more difficult to detect the 
aflfixal components of words, which are generally the least perceptually salient 
components^
If we entertain the possibility that grammar and the lexicon might be mediated by 
the same domain-general mechanism, then we can further entertain the possibility that SLI 
results from damage to that mechanism. This would explain not only the linguistic 
impairments SLI patients suffer, but also their /?o;?-linguistic impairments, which nativists 
cannot easily account for (nativists generally look for a dissociation between grammatical 
and general cognitive abilities). The problem with interpreting SLI as an emergent 
outcome is that we must assume that Bates and Goodman are correct about domain- 
generality in the first place.
My difficulty with Bates and Goodman’s examples of emergence is that they do 
not match up exactly with the emergence of grammar. Take, for instance, the bubbles 
analogy. When soap and water combine, there is only one contributing factor to the 
outcome which guarantees “maximum volume with minimum surface area,” namely that
^Stress in inflected English words rarely falls on the inflectional suffix. In other languages where stress falls on 
the suffix more often (e.g. Spanish preterite), it may prima face  seem easier to overcome this deficit, but upon 
closer examination, this option is improbable. Languages that stress inflectional affixes are usually highly 
inflectional languages, so the likelihood of en or increases as the possibility for acoustic deficiency decreases.
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mathematical law which governs volume/surface area relations. But clearly this is too 
direct a constraint in terms grammar's emergence. Grammar is the result of a whole 
collocation o f domain-general processes, but it is clearly not such a direct and 
overwhelming “forced move.” There are an infinite number of possible hypotheses that 
children could form about which rules are applicable to their particular language, and what 
the rules are to start with (Chomsky, 1986, 1988). Not just one factor contributes to a 
child’s ability to overcome this induction problem. It is a much more subtle affair, a 
“conspiracy” of mechanisms in Elman’s terms (1999).
The bee analogy (32) portrays a much less direct process by which honeycomb 
structures emerge.
When a bee returns to the hive after collecting pollen, she deposits a drop of wax- 
coated honey. Each of these honey balls is round and approximately the same size. 
As these balls get packed together, they take on the familiar hexagonal shape that 
we see in the honeycomb. There is no gene in the bee that codes for hexagonality 
in the honeycomb, nor is there any overt communication regarding the shaping of 
the cells of the honeycomb. Rather, this form is an emergent consequence of the 
application of packing rules to a collection of honey balls of roughly uniform size. 
(MacWhinney, 1999)
The regular structure of the honeycomb arises from the interaction of forces that 
wax balls exert on each other when compressed. The honeycomb can be described 
by a rule, but the mechanism which produces it does not contain any statement o f 
this rule [my italics]. (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1988)
Lacking both a genetically prespecified “blueprint” for honeycombs and a way to
communicate a common design with one another, bees simply follow local constraints-
snifFing out chemicals, secreting substances—and the structure emerges time and time
again. The local constraints governing the interaction of wax deposits—“packing rules,”
laws of physics, laws of molecular chemistry, physiological mechanics, behavioral
20
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regularities in other domains—interact in the packing process, and honeycombs emerge. 
There is clearly some sense in which this behavior has evolved, but we need not appeal 
solely to natural selection (and further, direct genetic encoding) to explicate the 
mechanisms that account for it. Self-organizational mechanisms do just fine; in fact, 
because honeycomb construction occurs in the absence o f direct genetic encoding, a 
genetic determinist’s account of the honeycomb phenomenon would be flat wrong.
Nevertheless, Bates and Goodman fall short of specifying, for the case of 
grammar, what exactly these local constraints are, or by what mechanisms grammar 
emerges from the lexicon. Bates and Goodman appeal to statistical regularities in 
childrens’ vocabularies—“critical mass” effects resulting from vocabulary size, threshold 
levels of lexical proficiency before grammar can kick in, etc.—but a sheer bulk of 
vocabulary items in the lexicon cannot, by itself, ensure the emergence of grammar. 
Vocabulary size may be one of the contributing factors to grammar’s emergence, but it is 
far too weak a constraint on its own. In theory, one could learn an enormous number of 
vocabulary items in a given language, yet fail to know how to string them together into an 
acceptable sentence.
Moreover, Bates and Goodman’s inference from these data (vocab/grammar 
correlations) is itself unwarranted. Because lexical performance is lawfully correlated 
with grammatical performance throughout childhood (correlation), grammar must be 
subserved by the same domain-general mechanism as the lexicon (causation). There is 
no further step in Bates and Goodman’s project to show us how particular grammatical 
operations are implemented by lexical mechanisms, and they have to be-a t least
21
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throughout early stages in development—because we apparently only have one mechanism 
(unless, o f course, we entertain alternative explanations). For past tense, then, the list of 
questions remains: if a critical mass of vocabulary items needs to be met in order to trigger 
grammatical processes, what ratio of regular to irregular verbs must there be to ensure a 
standard acquisition rate? To what extent are irregularization or regularization errors a 
factor of this ratio (environment), or a factor of innate architecture (this latter part of the 
question pertains even to general learning mechanisms)? And the list goes on for past 
tense and for other structures. Although researchers have filled in many of the gaps. Bates 
and Goodman’s immediate claims (domain-generality, a lack of dissociation) should really 
stand or fall by their own data. When it comes to their own data, however, their claims go 
grossly under-supported. Not only is the logic of their argument flawed 
(correlation=>causation), but more problematically, they fail to clarity the lexical 
mechanisms whereby particular grammatical structures emerge. Thus, their use of the 
term “emergence” requires further clarification, appeal to outside sources of data, or 
redefinition altogether.
2.2 Problems with Bates and Goodman’s Data:
One problem with Bates and Goodman’s data is that it is performance data, and 
Chomsky, for example, would likely just throw this out as an invalid and unreliable 
indicator of grammatical competence. Children possess tacit knowledge of language, 
which should be tested as well (“teased out”) to determine precisely when specific 
grammatical structures are acquired, and which linguistic principles are being applied.
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Without an account o f hwwledge o f  langiiage (competence), we have no grounds for 
linking grammar (what would this be?) to the lexicon. The problem is unavoidable for 
Bates and Goodman, whose data is primarily based on parental reports which document 
performance, unless we abandon the competence-performance distinction altogether (as it 
turns out, some view this as the most sensible alternative'*).
Another problem is that the data for grammatical proficiency at various stages in 
the sample’s development are based on MLU (mean length of utterance) scores. A 
standard complaint in applied linguistics is that MLU scores are cross-culturally unreliable.
Comparing the scores of an English toddler with those of a Spanish speaker is inequitable 
because the English toddler can get a score of 1-word-in-length for “go,” but it is unclear 
whether the Spanish toddler should get a 1 or 2-word-in-length score for “va” (“go,” or 
“you go,” also “ he goes,” “it goes,” or “she goes”). In highly inflected languages, this 
problem can mean a margin of error of 2-4 words (e.g. in Spanish, “c/awe/o” can be 
interpreted as 5 words, “you give it to me”). This is an astronomical number on the 
developmental scale, translating into a difference of over 20 months^! Bates and Goodman 
anticipate this problem, and offer corroborating data from Italian, a language more richly 
inflected than English. Their hypotheses are confirmed by Caselli and Casadio (1995) in 
the Italian data (presumably having controlled for the MLU problem), but still this means 
that we only have two cases, that of English and Italian, upon which to base our general 
theory of grammar (and of how and whence grammar emerges).
“Vor example, Givon (1999) characterizes the distinction as a “radical sanitization of the facts of natural 
language use,” a “logical sleight of hand” (83-4).
^Wittgenstein addresses this problem in a different context at the beginning of the PI (p. 9e).
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The third problem is the potential “apples and oranges” discrepancy in drawing a 
developmental link between grammar and the lexicon (40). For example, there is a 
remarkably strong correlation between the development o f the big toe and the 
development of grammatical abilities, “up to the ceiling,” so to speak, but this does not 
imply that functions of the big toe and grammatical operations are mediated by the same 
mechanism. Nevertheless, does the “apples and oranges” criticism have anything to say 
about what we are interested in, grammar and the lexicon? The lexicon, unlike the big 
toe, is at least a device that serves a linguistic function, so the correlation does seem to be 
a more reasonable one. Both are imperative for language (beyond an 8 month babbling 
stage) to even get off the ground. It is questionable, though, from Bates and Goodman’s 
data alone, that grammar nmst emerge from the lexicon (without clearly defining what this 
means), and further, that both nmst be subserved by non-linguistic mechanisms (this latter 
inference is the most controversial).
Nativists offer striking evidence to suggest that linguistic and non-linguistic 
development are, in fact, modularized. Smith and Tsimpli (1991) report on a 29 year old 
mentally handicapped individual with a non-verbal IQ averaging between 60 and 70, who 
enjoys native proficiency in English and remarkable proficiency in a number o f other 
languages (Ouhalla 1999; 4). Curtiss (1981) and Yamada (1990) report additional cases 
in which linguistic proficiency is negatively correlated with general cognitive skills. With 
evidence such as this, the nativist is able to take the same data (Bates and Goodman’s) and 
interpret it as the development of an interface between grammar and the lexicon. This 
could be seen as a problem for Bates and Goodman because they propose that
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grammatical and lexical operations are mediated by the same mechanism throughout 
childhood.
Even connectionist networks modeling aspects of lexical and grammatical 
development frequently find themselves committed to modularity. The connectionist 
models of past tense (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1988; Plunkett & Marchman, 1991, 1993; 
Daugherty & Seidenberg, 1994, 1999), for example, are all committed to at least a 
phonology module, which decodes the input signal into a readable form for the network, 
and encodes the network’s output into the projected English pronunciation for each given 
past tense form. Multi-layered processing of this sort operates according to principles 
similar to those governing serial processing, one layer’s function depending upon 
another’s in a serial, unidirectional manner. Some modelers build in further complexity to 
their networks by adding a “context” or “hidden” layer to serve more specialized jobs than 
the network as the whole (i.e. the formation of “internal representations,” see footnote 
11). Most connectionists would nevertheless happily agree to modularity in strict 
connectionist terms (i.e. multi-layered processing). It is the very nature o f connectionist 
processing that is of central concern, not hair-splitting over the definition of “modularity .” 
It is the realization that there is a necessity for such models to demonstrate how 
mechanically and mathematically higher-level “lawful” psychological behaviors can be 
implemented at the lower neural level.
We must be careful, nonetheless, to keep the issues cleanly apart. Bates and 
Goodman call for reassessment of a number of different nativist assumptions: (i) 
innateness, (ii) modularity, or information encapsulation, that is, that grammatical and
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lexical processes are kept distinct except at their interface (see Fodor, Modularity o f  the 
Mind, 1983), and (iii) domain-specificity, or encapsulation of one specific domain of 
processing (“grammar” set off from the “lexicon,” “syntax” from “semantics,” and so on), 
in other words, one mechanism (grammar) serving one class o f stimuli and only one, and 
the lexicon following suit. A function can be localized (i.e. routinely subserved by 
mechanisms in a predictable neural region), and simultaneously serve other classes of 
stimuli. Agrammatic patients with damage to Broca’s area, for example, have trouble 
processing and detecting suffixes, less salient word endings, and inflections (Pinker, 1999: 
248); so we can safely say that before trauma this function (inflection) was localized (after 
all, damage to the region leads to direct and specific impairment). But Broca’s area has 
also been found to serve other classes of stimuli (e.g. in nonverbal motor planning, see 
B&G, 1999: 65). Thus, localization is not equivalent to domain-specificity. Nonetheless, 
a function cannot be domain-specific without being modularized, which is precisely why 
Bates and Goodman appear to conflate the two notions in their article. It is argued (see 
“Discussion” section) that the domain-specificity/modularity relationship need not hold the 
other way around (modularity=>domain-specificity), so long as we re-focus our definition 
of modularity in terms of multi-layered processing. Still, the more standard notion of 
modularity (a la Fodor) should be applied to the dual-route theories o f past tense 
presented by Chomsky & Halle (1968) and Pinker (1999). In each theory, the two notions 
(Fodorian modularity/domain-specificity) indeed go hand and hand.
3.0 A Single Mechanism for Past Tense—Simulations of Emergent Processes:
26
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3.1 Implementations—
All connectionist models o f human behavior follow from the basic assumption that 
the behaviors they mimic are functions of associative memory. Any instance of 
“knowledge of language,” or better, any “generalization about language,” emerges in 
connectionist networks in a more or less bottom-up fashion. Thus, connectionist models 
stand in direct opposition to nativist models, as knowledge of language is in no sense built 
into the networks, the networks in no sense “knowing” the rules which merely describe 
their behavior. For this very reason, connectionist models exemplify some basic 
emergentist principles. Processing in one domain (general associative memory), in 
combination with other non-linguistic constraints (“maturational” constraints on memory), 
beget what appears to be lawful, rule-governed behavior in an entirely different domain 
(grammar)^.
From the operation of “dumb” local mechanisms (nodes, connections) comprising 
associative memory, what might be described as “grammatical knowledge” emerges, even 
though no rules of grammar are actually programmed into the network. The network’s 
behavior can be characterized as lawful, but no prespecified rules (specific to linguistic 
systems) govern its function. Associative memory is, of course, governed by rules, but 
these rules determine elements of general cognition, and are not characteristic of the 
linguistic system per se (e.g. Hume’s laws of contiguity—\{ A appears with B, associate 
them-and resemblance—\f  A looks like B, let B share A’s associations. Pinker 1999: 104).
^See Elman (1999) for techniques on how to model maturational constraints in connectionist nets. Also, note 
that “emergence” is being used here in the strict sense of “developmental emergence,” as defined by 
MacWhinney (1999: xi). Elsewhere I allude to biological (evolutionary) emergence, but these issues should be
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Linguistic knowledge, or generalization, is a function of the domain-general processes of 
associative memory, not a function of a domain-specific grammar module. Whatever 
structure or systematicity emerges in the network ultimately finds its source in association. 
Thus, connectionism is essentially a “memory all the way down” model of language and 
human behavior. From a structured training set and local associative processes, complex 
behaviors emerge in an altogether different domain (such as language). If we accept 
connectionist networks as valid homologues to certain key aspects of human brains (at 
least at some level of analysis), we begin to recognize them as tangible models of how 
associative mechanisms can overcome the apparent “induction problem” (Chomsky, 1986, 
1988).
3.2 The Model's Job—
Given a problem, connectionist networks generalize over patterns in memory to 
derive a solution. Any similarities between input and stored data affect the structure and 
clustering of features recorded in memory. Similar features are clustered together; so 
when making predictions about novel inputs, connectionist nets search their databases for 
similarities between features of the input and features of previous (stored) inputs. If 
similarities are detected, the network makes a prediction that the novel input must be 
computed similarly to the analogous one(s) stored in memory. New items are therefore 
“learned” on analogy, but only after the network has been adequately trained on a certain
kept separate.
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number of stem/past tense pairs.
For past tense formation, this would mean that (at least) the phonetic features of 
irregulars with similar stems and similar change patterns would form patterns in 
associative memory. A certain “training set” would be introduced to the network to 
provide it with a database to work with. In this case, the training set would consist of 
stems and fully inflected forms, and the resulting database would consist of features of 
stems and fully inflected forms, overlapping where similar. Training replicates input and 
learning, a certain amount of which is required to “switch on” the inflectional system (to 
this end, even generativists concede the importance of input). To model the transition 
from stage 1 to stage 2, for example, it has to be assumed that a certain number of correct 
irregular and regular forms (and types) have made it into the lexicon. And to model stage 
3, we would need an even greater number.
Generativists might object that training is “cheating” in a sense, because it flies in 
the face of the “poverty of stimulus” argument (Chomsky, 1986; 1988). It is arguable, 
however, that criticisms of this nature misinterpret what really happens during training. 
During training, the teacher signal only flags that some discrepancy has been found, not 
how to f ix  it. It just indicates that something has gone wrong, but not exactly what has 
gone wrong. There is no teacher to say, “That’s not how we say it; we say ‘walked.’” 
About the only thing a teacher would be saying in this case is “Oops.” If  walk gets 
inputted and comes out wooked (god forbid), the network adjusts the connections to the 
units which misfired (as well as the threshold value for those units). It “hunts and pecks” 
until it stumbles across the right answer, but it never gives the right answer. In fact, it is
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“news to itself’ that it has the right answer. Training is thus a more or less bottom-up 
process.
If  the network has been trained on walk-walked, and when subsequently fed /wak/, 
outputs /wakid/ instead of /wakl/, it compares the incorrect output with the correct form 
in memory, and the network’s weights change according to its “learning rule” (which 
conveys a “dumb” mechanical operation, like “add .2,” or “subtract .8"—an algorithm). 
Likewise, if a child entering stage 2, whose lexicon contains an instance of walk-walked 
(memorized “rote” in Stage 1 ), produces /wakId/ (say, due to performance constraints), 
the child’s associative memory would most likely detect that /wakid/contains features not 
shared by the dominant pattern, and would cluster it separately (as a “working 
hypothesis”). The more and more walk-walked is used correctly in the future, and the 
more and more regulars are added to the stem-stem and change-change pattern, the less 
and less robust the “working hypothesis” pattern becomes; thus, walk-wooked becomes an 
increasingly less likely candidate for use in past tense computation.
When given a novel stem, the network in a sense “blends” features of the stored 
past tense forms of similar sounding (and meaning) verbs. For example, given the novel 
verb “spling,” the network would (i) represent it as a certain distinct set of features 
(phonetic, semantic, both, or others), (ii) cluster this set of features with similar ones in 
memory (the “lexicon”), and either (iii) superimpose the /e/ sound onto /spl_Q/ to produce
“splang” on analogy to spring—>sprang (or to other members of the ing-ang-tmg family), 
or (iv) generalize the most probable change in featural sets (add /d /- if  /d/ is indeed the 
most common overlapping feature of past tenses in memory at the point when “spling” is
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inputted); (iv) occurs in the case that other change patterns (i.e. irregular ones) are not 
strong enough to attract the novel verb into their families. Clearly, then, one of the chief 
concerns for modelers of English past tense is what amount, type, and distribution of 
featural sets in memory (e.g. the ratio of regular to irregular verbs) acts as a constraint on 
past tense learning.
4.0 The Rumelhart and McClelland Model:
In the 1980s, Rumelhart and McClelland (hereafter R&M) and the PDF research 
group sent a shock wave throughout the scientific community with their claim that highly 
lawful human behavior can be implemented in a system that follows no explicit rules. The 
successes of connectionist models challenge nativists to reconsider their biases toward 
language acquisition, or at least to reconsider specifically what behaviors are a function of 
associative memory (general cognition) as opposed to a function of grammar. R&M’s 
success at modeling past tense has challenged more traditional rule-driven models o f the 
inflectional system to reassess whether “rules of grammar” characterize the inherent 
construction and mechanistic procedure of the system, or whether they are mere 
epiphenomena of some other domain of processes (the tools of descriptive linguists).
If R&M are correct that regular and irregular past tense can be successfully 
learned by their network, then the model is at least beneficial to show that there may be a 
more viable alternative model to rule-based, modular theories; this could at least lead to 
revisions o f more traditional symbolic moûtls—revisionist connectionism (e.g. Pinker's 
revision of the lexicon in the dual-route account). If R&M are further correct that past
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tense is learned by a sort of domain-general pattern associator in human brains, then we 
can either (i) eliminate the more traditional symbolic theories (this would be the most 
radical mowe—eliminaiive connectionism—in which case “rules of grammar” would be 
inexact descriptions of both higher and lower level processes), or (ii) explore 
connectionist networks as models of how higher-level symbolic processes are 
implemented at the lower level, in which case “rules of grammar” would be exact 
descriptions at the higher level but only approximate descriptions at the lower level 
{“implementational” connectionsm). Establishing that past tense is subserved by domain- 
general mechanisms is a project left for other researchers, outside of R&M’s immediate 
scope. Thus, they can only establish that PDFs can learn past tense, and that this may be 
the right model to go with.
R&M model past tense formation in an attempt to show that past tense can be 
learned without explicit unconscious rules (i.e. with absolutely no KOL built in). To do 
this successfully, R&M’s network needs to accurately model the three-stage u-shaped 
learning curve, which has now become standard in the study of past tense (Brown, 1973; 
Ervin, 1964; Kuczaj, 1977). In stage 1, kids use a small handful o f verbs in the past tense.
These are usually the highest frequency verbs (“light verbs,” do-did, go-went, put-put, 
make-made, give-gave, and others like eat-ate, walk-walked, play-played), the majority of 
which are irregulars. Kids in stage 1 use the correct forms most of the time, and make few 
mistakes, as their lexicon has not yet been cluttered by the surge of novel forms.
The transition from stage 1 to stage 2 is where the controversy gets thick, as it has 
elsewhere been taken as evidence for implicit KOL (Pinker&Prince, 1988, 1994; Pinker,
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1999). By stage 2, kids have built upon their limited repertoires of verbs from stage 1, 
and more and more regulars have seeped into their lexicons (the ratio o f regulars to 
irregulars is spreading). In stage 2, kids begin to generalize the regular rule to most novel 
forms, and overgeneralize it to irregular forms, even to ones they have routinely gotten 
correct in stage 1. Pinker (1999) sees the transition to stage 2 as indicative of separate 
mechanisms for words and rules. If a child says “walked” for the past tense of ‘walk,’ she 
may have just memorized the past form, but if she predicts the past tense of the novel verb 
‘plick’ is “plicked,” there is evidence that she implicitly “knows” the regular rule. Further, 
if Pinker can show that regularization of novel stems has little or nothing to do with the 
frequency and distribution of the input, we have evidence that the onset of the rule 
mechanism’s operation (at beginning of Stage 2) is motivated by factors outside the 
domain of lexical learning. Nevertheless, if R&M can demonstrate that their model not 
only replicates the u-shaped learning curve, but also overgeneralizes the regular rule to 
novel stems in stage 2, then we have a viable alternative to rule-based, dual-mechanism 
theories.
In stage 3, regularization of novel stems continues, but kids have regained their 
ability to produce the correct irregular past tenses. Clusters of exceptions begin forming 
in memory, e.g. the ing-ang-ung family, and the inflectional system stabilizes. Once 
clusters of exceptions form, the tendency to make irregularization errors increases, as 
patterns in memory attract candidate stems to their change class based on stem-stem 
similarities. Thus, in stage 2, the novel verb “spling” would most probably be regularized, 
although in stage 3, when the ing-ang-ung change family has gained strength, it may resist
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the dominant regular pattern to be irregularized (especially where there is only one 
featural difference, e.g. between “spling” [^lateral] and “spring” [-lateral]). In stage 3, the 
number of regulars in the lexicon outweighs the number of irregulars, so the irregular 
pattern has to be incredibly robust for irregularization to occur.
4.1 Patterns—
R&M designed a connectionist network which decodes phonologically represented 
input sequences (verb stems, past tense forms) into distinct sets of features. During 
training, the model is fed the phonological representation of both the stem of a verb and its 
past tense (e.g. /ækt/, “act,” and /æktid/, “acted”). Each node codes for groups of 3
phonemes (Wickelphones), so /ækt/ would be decoded as {#æk, ækt, kt#}, and the 3
nodes coding for {#æk}, {ækt}, and {kt#} (respectively) would fire upon input. The
Wickelphone encoding solution allows R&M to represent words in as “distributed” 
representations, without forfeiting their distinctness. If each node coded for a single 
phoneme (rather than 3), every last bit of positional information would be lost upon input 
(e.g. the difference between “tip” and “pit” would be lost because the same nodes would 
fire for each, see Pinker, 1999: 111-3). A model that encodes words as featural sets 
without segmenting them in some fashion would not be able to represent words with 
overlapping featural sets (e.g. tip-pit, slit-silt, etc.). Even “slit” and “silt’ remain distinct 
under such a model: /slit/—>{#sl, sll, lit. It#} while /silt/—>{#sl, sll, lit, It#}, each with no 
two Wickelphones in common.
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The trouble with the Wickelphone solution is that there are too many of them, and 
they are too specific. Assuming that we distinguish 35 different phonemes, the 
number of Wickelphones would be 35^, or 42, 875, not even counting the 
Wickelphones containing word boundaries. And, if we postulate one input unit 
and one output unit in our model for each Wickelphone, we require a rather large 
connection matrix (4.3 x 10'*) to represent all their possible connections.
To avoid the problem of hyper-complexity, R&M boiled Wickelphones down into
Wickelfeatures, each Wickelphone defined by a distinct set o f Wickelfeatures. Each node,
then, codes for a specific set of 3 features (one for each phoneme in each Wickelphone).
For example, a node that encodes [[+silibant], [^lateral], [+high]] (respectively) would fire
for the Wickelphone {sll} (from “slit”), and other nodes would fire for {sll} according to
the same criterion (e.g. a node encoding [[-voice], [+voice], [+front]] would also fire).
When all is said and done, nodes encoding the features [+vocalic], [+high], [+front],
[-long] would all fire for the III in “slit” (ditto for the rest of slit's phonemes and their
relevant features), rendering the representation distinct from all others (e.g. distinct from
the representation for “slot”).
Phonetic features offer a significantly more compact way of representing the
elements that make up words. Thirty-five phonemes can be represented using only 16
features. Each phoneme in a given Wickelphone is assigned a value (0 or 1) for each of
the 16 features. This means that the preceding and following “context” phonemes (e.g. /p/
& it! in the Wickelphone /pit/ from {#pl, pit. It#}) are also assigned featural values.
Context information is recorded by memory in order to formulate stem-stem and change-
change patterns. Due to its features, /pit/ might fall into the hit-hit pattern, and later, into
the regular “add /-Id/} [+cons, +dental]_” pattern based on stem-stem and especially stem-
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final similarities, /pit/ ending in a dental consonant. Without context phonemes, 
generalization would be a highly inefficient mode of learning, as there would be little 
information in terms of stem-stem similarities upon which to base generalization. Since 
the difference between “silt” and “slit” would be lost, for example, the network would 
never be able to predict any difference between their past tense forms (using “silt” as a V 
here), even though “to silt” always goes silted, yet “to slit” can either go slitted or slit.
In R&M’s network, words are distributed representations; that is, words are 
represented by a distinct pattern o f activation over the input units, each unit encoding a 
particular set of features (i.e. whatever input units “fire,” or get fed a “ I,” represent a 
given word). No single unit codes for a single word, and the same unit gets re-used in 
many different representations (e.g. units coding for [+vocalic, +high, +front] might fire 
for any word with an IV or an /i/). Predicted past tense forms are represented by whatever 
pattern o f activation occurs over the output units. Just as neurons perform only simple 
mechanical operations (get excited, fire ballistically, etc.), so too do nodes (units). Since 
each output unit has a threshold value, not only does the learning rule adjust the weights if 
an error is detected, it also slightly lowers or raises the threshold value for the output 
nodes. During training, modelers note the output pattern of activation for each word that 
gets run though, stems and past tense forms alike, so that each input has a predictable 
output; this way modelers have the ability to know when an error occurs (i.e. when the 
expected pattern is different from the actual one)
Whenever there is a discrepancy between the target output (stored in memory after 
being learned) and the actual response, in other words, whenever a certain set o f nodes
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representing the target output are supposed to fire but “miss,” the learning rule kicks in to 
mechanically adjust the network’s weights (it also adjusts the threshold values of the 
deviant output units). The “weights” in R&M’s network are numeric values which fill the 
variables o f its learning algorithm (e.g. ‘X - 2/output = “ 1” & target = “0,”’ or ‘Y+.8/o=0 
& t= l ’ [simplified for clarity]). These values represent the strength o f connectivity 
between input and output nodes. In neural terms, we would be talking about how 
dedicated a neural synapse (axon-dendrite interface) is to a given stimulus (e.g. in 
localized fiinctions, the neural pathway gets routinely entrenched by the same stimulus—a 
highly connected system). According to one of its uses, the computational “neural” 
network, or connectionist network, is essentially a mathematical, algorithmic metaphor for 
lower level processes—for “neural information sharing.” Connectionism thus provides an 
“abstract neurology” (as it is often put, e.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) for implementing 
higher-level theories of behavior. Connectionist networks are mechanisms designed to 
receive some bit of numerically encoded information (for our purposes, verb stems) and 
compute an output value based on computations across weights.
The value “1” represents a node firing (a certain bit of information being inputted), 
so if a node fires, we have “1” times the value of the weight, say, .2 , which equals .2 (our 
output). If the threshold value of a connected output unit is above .2 (say, it’s 1), the unit 
doesn’t fire. If the unit that didn’t fire causes a mis-match between the actual output and 
the target vector, the learning rule kicks in. The learning rule adjusts the weights (e.g. 
‘Y+.8/o=0 & t= l,’ so '.2 +.8=1,’ the node fires), as well as the threshold value (“ 1” in our 
example, so we’re guaranteed a “hit”). All things being equal, an input that causes an
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error can be re-fed to the network, and the weights and threshold values will eventually 
stabilize. Stable states o f the network are signs of robust patterns in memory. If a novel 
input has features that are strongly associated, modelers can predict (approximately) what 
weight settings and threshold values they need to activate the target (based on patterns of 
activation and connectivity for computing similar inputs). The behavior of stable systems 
can rightly be characterized as lawful. “Rules,” as descriptions of lawful behavior, are also 
distributed, in that they capture a certain pattern of connectivity between input and output 
nodes (i.e. whatever pattern of weight settings and threshold values is required to fire only 
those output nodes representing the correct form for a particular class).
Words are also “distributed” in a different (but related) sense, insofar as they are 
stored as sets of features overlapping with other sets where similar features are shared. As 
such, words are bits and pieces of “shared” phonological information (features).
Outputted past tense forms for novel verbs are essentially “blends” of features from the 
input sequence with features of past tense forms of similar stems in memory. Because 
words are nothing but sets of features in R&M’s network, memory is not taxed by 
needless information. Memory encodes only the minimal amount of information needed 
to distinguish words and compute their past tenses.
The “-ed rule,” or better, the “-ed generalization,” is implemented in whatever 
pattern of activation and connectivity elicits a particular regular past tense. In a sense, 
then, each past tense form gets its own mini-rule. The more robust a pattern in memory 
gets, the more stable the pattern of connectivity; that is, the “setting” of weights used to 
compute verbs with similar features gets more and more regular (but rarely is it identical).
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The “average” weight settings for each verb in a particular class would approximate the 
“general rule” for that class, but “rule” here would merely be a descriptive term (rules are 
not explicitly programmed into the network, or prescriptions for behavior). The most 
stable pattern of connectivity, reflective of the most robust pattern in memory, is what 
could be called the “most regular rule.”
No input-output connections are hard-wired (weights preset) to compute regular 
verbs (nor could we point to anything we could rightly call a “word” in any single unit). A 
word inputted over and over again sparks a somewhat novel pattern of connectivity each 
time it is processed. As training increases, words more or less take the same pattern, so 
really we can at best make probabilistic predictions about the network’s next state. The 
sense of “implemented rule” gets extremely muddled in connectionist systems. Mini-rules 
have no variables, containing only those values that have been inputted into a particular 
computation (only those values of a particular cluster of “words”); or at best, it contains 
an average o f these values. At the level of nodes and connections, nothing falling under 
the rubric “rule of grammar” is prespecified. No node follows the explicit program “add - 
ed.” Regardless, the structure emerges. From a linguist’s perspective, it is a consequence 
of highly lawful linguistic behavior (rule application), but the only rules at work at the 
lower level are general associative rules.
Innate KOL could be modeled by hard-wiring, or prespecifying, certain weights 
and threshold values. But this would undercut the very goal of connectionism, which is to 
model KOL without built-in explicit rules. Words and rules in connectionist networks are 
thus like virtual entities. Bits and pieces of featural segments generated by the network to
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constitute a predicted past tense form are analyzed into coherent words upon output. 
Words are therefore both “causal” and “analytic” emergents (see Appelbaum, 2000). 
Outputs for novel stems are structures (distinct sets o f features) causally generated from 
domain-general processes o f association, yet they reflect the operation of a linguistic rule. 
Moreover, the only representations that are generated for words are distributed, which 
leads us to the second sense in which words are emergent. Distributed representations— 
generated by “blending” features—are subsequently analyzed as strings of phonemes, that 
is, as coherent “wholes” (at least we hear them as such). The decoder mechanism built 
into R&M’s network would handle the task of “analysis.” For reasons of tedium, R&M 
sent only a subset o f featural sets (outputs) through the decoder; in fact, they were the 
ones who interpreted the rest of the output patterns (Pinker & Prince, 1988; also see 
R&M, pp. 269-271). Their model is primarily concerned with causally generating 
structures. As a model of the way we compute past tense, however, we would have to 
appeal to some level o f analysis at which words appear to be coherent “wholes.”
Because “rules” in R&M’s network are generalizations over patterns in memory, 
or stable states of the network, regularity is essentially subregularity. We can describe the 
network’s subregularities with talk of “rules,” but the rule remains unspecified. When we 
get down to the level of nodes and connections, all we have are local, “dumb” mechanical 
operations in an entirely different domain. In a sense, then, rules are analytic emergents as 
well. They characterize the average distribution of connectivity required to compute 
members of a robust class, or the weight settings that naturally fall out of patterns in 
memory. From a psychological persepective, though, children seem to apply the rule
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which characterizes these subregularities—"add -ed”—especially in stage 3, so R&M’s 
network arguably shows us only one level of the process (i.e. the lower level).
Without explicitly programmed grammatical rules, R&M’s model succeeded at 
modeling the u-shaped learning curve for past tense formation. The 460 verbs it was 
trained on were then run through the model, stems only, and it predicted all 460 of the 
correct past tense forms. More importantly, when novel irregular stems were run through 
it, the model achieved an 85% success rate, and a 90% success rate with novel regulars 
(261). (See tables 1 and 2.) Not only does the model demonstrate the presence of stable 
patterns in memory—so much so that the patterns attract novel verbs to their class, 
potentially causing irregularization errors (mimicking late stage 2 and stage 3)—it also 
demonstrates productivity when it comes to regular past tense. If irregular patterns aren’t 
strong enough and novel stems not similar enough, the network fits the novel verb into the 
most robust pattern of all—regularity’. Generalization to the regular pattern occurs with 
every eligible stem, the hallmark of a productive inflectional system.
4.2 Problems—
We should not be immediately convinced that we need to abandon rule-based, 
dual-route approaches altogether. Pinker & Prince (1988, 1994) and Pinker (1999) bring 
a number of criticisms to bear on connectionist models o f past tense such as R&M’s
’o f  course, there are three sub-classes of regularity (/-d/, /-Id/, and /-t/), but decision between them can be 
made on similarity of the end “trigger’ feature. We have /-Id/ for stems ending [+dental, +cons], /-t/ for stems 
ending [-voice, +cons], and /-d/ for stems ending [+voice, +cons or -t-vowel] (see also R&M, p. 247).
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Pinker’s main contention (1999) is that connectionist networks do fine at modeling 
irregular past tense, but poorly at modeling regular, due to problems inherent in the 
architecture of unconstrained connectionist systems in general. Pinker argues that 
connectionist theorists have misinterpreted inconsistencies between modeling data and 
child acquisition data to be indicative of shortcomings in modeling techniques (which has 
fueled connectionist research for the past two decades). Pinker submits that 
inconsistencies o f this nature should in fact tell us that single mechanism architecture is 
//se//"insufficient to handle the child acquisition data.
What connectionists gain with non-modular architecture (a single mechanism 
alternative), they lose in accuracy. The lack of a morphology module in the R&M model, 
which only maps phonological representations of the input onto phonological 
representations in the output, causes considerable disanalogy with human language 
processing. No information as to “structure of lexical entry,” “head of word,” “root of 
word,” “morphological category—N, V, Adjective,” “morphological structure,” “word = 
stem + affix,” nor any lexical-semantic information, gets inputted into R&M’s inflectional 
system. But kids and adults alike are sensitive to exactly this sort of information, to the 
structure o f words, not just to the sounds words, when processing regular and irregular 
inflections. Thus, the accuracy of the model stands to be questioned.
In a series of studies across a multitude of populations—college students, children 
ranging from 3-10 years o f age—Kim et. al (1994) provide evidence that children’s 
inflectional decisions have more to do with morphosyntactic concerns than with 
phonology alone. Two of the experiments, one on 3-5 year olds and another on 6-8 year
42
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
olds, aimed at teasing out children’s tacit morphological knowledge of “root,” “head,”
“noun,” “verb,” and “lexical entry.” The children in each study were given forced verb
choices like the following;
1.) This is a fly. Can you say ‘This is a fly?’ I’m going to fly this board.
{Put flies all over the board)
I ju s t____ .
2a) This airplane is going to fly. Can you say ‘This airplane is going to fly?’ This 
airplane is about to fly through the air.
{Have the airplane f ly  about)
The airplane ju s t .
2b.) Mickey likes to drive really fast Look, Mickey is going to fly down the road. 
Can you say ‘Mickey is going to fly down the road?’
{Have Mickey drive fa st down the road)
Mickey ju s t .
Children 6-8 years o f age generalized the regular rule to questions like #1 (denominals) 
66.7% o f the time, and children 3-5 64.1% of the time The 6-8 year olds regularized 
questions like #2a (verb roots) only 11.1% of the time, whereas 3-5 year olds regularized 
#2b (semantically extended verb roots) 46.6% of the time. Children 6-8 irregularized 
questions like #1 17.6% of the time, and 3-5 year olds 5.6%. 6-8 year olds irregularized 
questions like #2a 87.0% of the time, and 3-5 year olds 22 .6% (for #2b).
So why don’t children cue on phonological similarity (as R&M’s network would) 
and irregularize #1 more than they do (only -35%  of the time)? There must be something 
else that their inflectional system is attuned to. There are three options-morphology, 
semantics, or both. MacWhinney & Leinbach (1991), with their updated model o f past 
tense, encode basic semantic (as well as phonetic) features into the input units, and are 
thus able to surmount problems that cripple older models (e.g. homonyms with different
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past tenses). Still, it is not certain that semantic information acts as input to the 
inflectional system. If it did, the network would predict that verbs with similar meanings 
take similar past tenses, which, for obvious reasons, is an unreliable and unnecessary 
indicator o f past tense form (e.g. hit, slap, and strike are semantically related but all take 
different past tenses—A/t, slapped, and struck'). Semantically related families of words do 
not consistently undergo the same past tense change. The fact that children produce 
different past tenses for hit, slap, and strike may reflect the need to index a specific lexical 
item to decipher past tense (e.g. a specific stored past tense form, along with its lexical 
features, e.g. N, V, or Adj.).
Lakoff (1987) would explain the fact that kids don’t irregularize #1 more often by 
appealing to the semantic principle of “central sense,” that is, if a polysemous verb— 
fly/fly  (out)—hdî  an irregular form, its central sense (the one kids more likely associate with 
the verb—‘fly’ as in “birds fly”) will be irregular. The tendency, then, is to predict that if 
the central sense is irregular, any non-central sense falls under the regular rule. “When a 
verb is given an extended or metaphorical meaning, the new sense is felt to be dissimilar to 
the original, and this inhibits the speaker from using the original’s irregular form” (Pinker, 
1999: 151). Pinker nevertheless provides a number of counterexamples which indicate 
that semantic extension per se has no bearing on a word’s past tense. For example, novel 
words made by adding prefixes to irregulars almost always take the irregular, even though 
the “sense” of the word may radically change. Instances are overeat-overate from eat-ate, 
overshot, preshrank, remade, outsold, undid, and the list goes on. This effect occurs with 
idioms as well, like “yZew off the handle,” not %/7W off the handle.”
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If it’s not semantic information that children are cuing on when they choose flied  
for #1, what is it? Pinker (1999) argues that children exploit morphological cues in the 
input to overcome the mapping problem with novel senses. What compels children to 
choose flied  in Kim’s study (-65%  of the time) is implicit knowledge of “root,” “head,” 
“lexical entry,” and “morphological category.” Since the root offlied  is the noun ‘fly’ (as 
in “the buzzing fly”), not the verb, the VP flied  must be headless, or “exocentric” (Kim et 
al., 1994, 181). What would its head be? We’ve already established that it is a noun, not 
a verb, so it must be ‘fly’ (N). But it can't be ‘fly’ (N), because then the properties o f ‘fly’ 
(N) would percolate up to the phrasal level, and flied  (to fly) would have to be a noun 
phrase! Because flied  is headless, there is no possibility o f the irregular form heading this 
phrase, percolating up its own properties, so no irregular properties ever get inputted into 
the inflectional system, only properties of the noun ‘fly.’ Kids build flied h y  accessing ‘fly’ 
(N) from memory, and inputting it into their inflectional systems. They couldn’t possibly 
be building “flied” from ‘fly’ (V), because ‘fly’ (V) is stored with its irregular past tense 
form (flew), which would inevitably trigger the blocking mechanism, yet the regular rule 
fo r  “flied "  remains unblocked.
The inability o f R&M’s network to reliably predict the regularity offly  in “fly the 
board” is arguably a major setback for single mechanism theories. Whichever theory 
accounts for the most data is the theory that should be advanced. Single-mechanism 
theories o f past tense lack the appropriate lexical and morphological tools to account for 
the fact that kids say flied  in “Mickey flied the board” (Put flies on the board). 
MacWhinney and Leinbach (1991), it is argued, fail to make much headway. There is
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little evidence that children are predictingy7/e<i based on semantics alone. In fact, 
semantics is an unreliable guide into the mapping problem, as counterexample after 
counterexample leads kids astray. To be able to reliably predict flied  for #1, modelers 
would have to build morphology layers into their networks, but once this is done, we have 
a full-fledged modular system (albeit “modules,” or layers, of PDFs). A morphology layer 
would partially satisfy Pinker, but not completely. Something appears to be wrong with 
the mechanism itself.
R&M’s model stores the past tenses of regulars in memory; it memorizes regular 
past tenses, even though there is no need to because regularization occurs by statistical 
default. According to Pinker (1999), regular past tense forms are stored in the lexicon 
only in root form (untagged). The two components of the linguistic system—grammar 
(with its sub-components) and the lexicon—are inputted with an eligible stem in parallel. 
The lexicon searches its database for a match, for the same or similar root clustered with 
its irregular past tense form. If  it finds a match, the rule is blocked by an innate blocking 
mechanism. If not, the rule fires as a default. (See figure 4.) Stored past tense forms for 
regulars would be superfluous. All we need is a stem to fill the default rule’s variable, and 
this can be derived from roots stored in the lexicon (via the application of “lexical rules”). 
Thus, Pinker paints a much less structured, more economical portrait of memory than the 
connectionists. No “regular pattern” exists in Pinker’s lexicon, as each case of regularity 
is subsumed under the rule.
The fle\v-flied ambiguity in the Kim et. al. (1994) study is part of a larger problem 
for R&M’s network. Pinker & Prince (1988, 1994) point out that the network cannot tell
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the difference between homonyms (break-broke, brake-braked, ring-rang, wring-wrung, 
lie-lied, lie-lay), insofar as the network uses sound (and sound alone) to compute past 
tense. Children, on the other hand, especially in stage 3, attune themselves to the 
structure o f words during linguistic processing, that is, to the fact that a word can take a 
stem plus an affix, that words have roots, and that words, like phrases, have heads. If 
words were stored in a more coherent sense in the network (i.e. with semantic and/or 
morphological representations), the homonym problem would be solved. Like kids, the 
network would simply note that “braked,” for example, is exocentric, so all the properties 
of the irregular verb form would be blocked. Because “braked” is headless, there is no 
pathway up which these irregular properties could percolate. Without “lexical entries” to 
encode such morphological and semantic information—bridging the gap between sound 
and meaning—R&M’s network cannot accurately model the acquisition of past tense.
A handful o f R&M’s predicted outputs for novel verbs, moreover, turn out to be 
ugly, mangled blends of features (tour—>toureder, mail—>membled). Whenever novel 
regular stems are fed to R&M’s network which contain features peripheral (or orthogonal) 
to other regular patterns in memory, it blends whatever scraps of overlapping information 
are applicable to form the novel past tense. But this is not true when it comes to people, 
who, when encountering a novel stem with little to no similarity to acceptable words of 
their language, routinely generalize the regular pattern (e.g. in the “ploamph” test; Prasada 
& Pinker, 1993). Prasada & Pinker (1993) gave both humans and a replica o f R&M’s 
network a past tense formation task for novel stems (e.g. “plip,” “glinth,” “smaig,” 
“ploamph,” “smeerg”). Humans generalize the “-ed” suffix to all novel verbs (without
47
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
similar sounding irregulars) regardless of similarity to other regular stems, in fact, 
regardless of whether the novel stem is an acceptable English word. For example, “plip” 
(a phonotactically acceptable word in English) was turned into “plipped” by humans at 
nearly the same rate that “ploamph” (an phonotactically unacceptable in English) was 
turned into “ploamphed.” The network, on the other hand, came up with bizarre blends 
not found in the human data, like brilth—>prevailed, or even worse, smeej—>leefloag, 
ploanth—>bro, smeeb~>imin. Moreover, it was not even able to produce the past tense 
o f “ploamph” except on 10% of the trials (Pinker, 1999: 143),
/rregulars, of course, should be susceptible to the mail-membled error because 
they are stored in the lexicon. Regulars, on the other hand, should not be affected by such 
association because they are not stored in the lexicon (but “mail” is regular, so this would 
be an obvious problem for R&M). Nevertheless, before we can claim that mail-membled 
is a problem for R&M, we have to assume Pinker is right about regular storage (or the 
lack thereof) in the first place. In R&M’s defense, it is not clear that children are immune 
from such error (although adults probably are). Pinker and Pasada’s tests were based 
primarily on adult performance, but when we look at past tense elicitations done on kids 
(e.g. Kim et al., 1994), jumbled answers are occasionally given. In fact, Kim et al. reserve 
a column in their data for “uncodable” responses, which, for 3-5 year olds in Experiment 
#2, occur nearly 10% of the time (191). Membled would be one such “uncodable” 
response (though there would have to be a limit to stretching this, e.g. yield~>rilt, see 
“Convergent Model” section).
At this point, only one of the problems mentioned really undermines R&M’s
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prefect—the homonym problem (e.g. hng—>rang, but wrmg~->wrwig\ f ly —>flew, but 
f ly —>flied when derived from a noun). A related problem is that Wickelphonology cannot 
even represent the words of some languages. The meanings associated with full 
reduplications in reduplicating languages would be lost altogether, bringing into question 
the cross-cultural accuracy of R&M’s model. Algal, in Australian Oykangand, means 
‘more or less straight’ whereas algalgal means ‘perfectly straight’ (Sommer, 1980; Pinker 
& Prince, 1988), but these words are indistinguishable according to Wickelfeatures alone. 
Algal gets treated by the network as (#al, alg, Iga, gal, al#}, being further decomposed 
into triplets o f Wickelfeatures, and algalgal gets treated as (#al, alg, Iga, gal, alg, Iga, gal, 
al#), also being further decomposed. But there is no Wickelfeature that will be present in 
the one set for algal while not in other for algalgal (the same nodes would fire for each). 
Thus, there is no principled way for the network to detect it is dealing with two different 
words with two different meanings, unless we build a MacWhinney and Leinbach (1991) 
type widget into the model.
Finally, we come to the issue of “jiggery-pokery” (Pinker’s term )-the criticism 
that R&M’s results are contrived, or “forced,” due to their manipulation of training data 
and input units For one, R&M purposefully “blurred” the Wickelfeature representation 
(the input) to enhance generalization (R&M, 1988: 238-9). “This is accomplished by 
turning on, in addition to the 16 primary Wickelfeatures, a randomly selected subset of the 
similar Wickelfeatures, specifically, those having the same value for the central feature and 
one of the two context phonemes” (238). The result of turning on Wickelfeatures 
superfluous to the task of representing the input is that “each word will activate a larger
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set o f Wickelfeatures, allowing what is learned about one sequence of phonemes to 
generalize more readily to other similar but not identical sequences” (238). By sparking 
Wickelfeatures o f other members of a given class (pattern), the network gets a head start 
at figuring out which weight setting is required to compute the right answer. The 
superfluous Wickelfeatures are like “lead blockers.” They cause the network’s weight 
settings to be in a state partially equivalent to the one needed to compute members of a 
particular pattern (of which the novel verb is a candidate). Without “blurring,” the 
network runs the risk of becoming entrenched in idiosyncratic input features, in which case 
generalization would slow to a creeping halt.
Secondly, R&M structured their input to facilitate u-shaped learning, but this is 
arguably an instance of “jiggery-pokery” as well. In the first stage of training, the network 
was fed 10 stem-past tense pairs, 2 of which were regular (20%). In stage 2, though, 
R&M changed the regular-irregular ratio, and regulars constituted 80% of the input. But 
R&M’s training set is in many ways orthogonal to the input kids actually get exposed to 
(Pinker & Prince, 1988, 1994; Pinker, 1999). The ratio of regulars to irregulars in the 
actual data is no more than 50% throughout stage 2 (Brown, 1973; Slobin, 1971; Pinker 
& Prince, 1988), a figure which would seriously impair the network’s ability to stumble 
across the regular pattern*. After all, it is a probabilistic machine, and the strength of 
patterns in memory (i.e. of “types”) is relative to the input frequency of “token” members 
of the relevant class. In a 50-50 situation (50% regular, 50% irregular), we would most
This ratio is contradicted by Marchman & Bates (1994: 353-4), whose figure reads 55% regulars around age 
2;3. Nevertheless, this is insuHicient for R&M’s simple recurrent network (SRN), though success can be met 
with such an input distribution in newer models with hidden layers.
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likely wind up with close to 50-50 results (i.e. the regular “rule” would potentially forfeit 
its regularity). Moreover, R&M abruptly increased the size of the training set (into phase 
2 of training) from 10 verbs (cycled 10 times) to 420 verbs (cycled 190 times), but this too 
yields considerable divergence from the child acquisition data (Dromi, 1987; Bates et al., 
1992; Marchman & Bates, 1994), which speaks more of incremental learning. Both cases 
o f “jiggery-pokery” addressed by Pinker (1999) appear to indicate that the model is 
fundamentally inadequate.
4.3 Implications—
If we reject MacWhinney and Leinbach’s model, what remains is a model riddled 
with holes. R&M’s model has no idea of “word structure.” Nevertheless, kids and adults 
alike are sensitive to more than just the sounds of words. Kids and adults generalize the 
regular rule to “denominal” (derived from a N) and “exocentric” (headless) verbs, for 
example, indicating that sound alone falls short of adequate input for the inflectional 
system (Kim et al., 1994; Pinker & Prince, 1988, 1994; Pinker 1999). Denominal verbs 
like to f ly  out (to center field), to ring (the bottle), to spit (the pig), to high-stick (the 
goalie) are routinely regularized by kids and adults (Kim et al., 1994; Pinker & Prince, 
1988, 1994; Pinker, 1999). Few irregularization errors occur with denominal verbs, 
despite the fact that many of these verbs are phonologically identical to irregulars (fly- 
flew, ring-rang, spit-spat, stick-stuck). This is evidence that sound alone is an inadequate 
predictor of past tense.
What blocks the irregular rule in cases of denominal verbs is the fact that they are
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linked to the noun form, but not to their verb forms. The verb form of “fly” is not the 
head of “to fly out” (in fact, it is a headless, or “exocentric” construction); rather, it is 
derived from the NP “fly ball,” or more simply, from “fly” (as in “a pop fly”). Again, if 
“fly” (as in “fly ball”) were the head, whose properties in the standard theory percolate up 
to the phrasal level, then “to fly out” would have to be a noun phrase. Thus, “to fly out” 
must be a headless VP. The fact that people are sensitive to these sorts of 
morphosyntactic constraints—seldom producing “flew out” (to center field) even though 
“flew out” (the window) allures them into the y->ew  change pattern—demonstrates that 
people are, albeit unconsciously, applying notions like “head,” “root,” “lexical entry,” etc.
R&M’s model handles irregulars with good results; even Pinker sees the lexicon 
as a sort o f pattern associator, inherently skilled at detecting, storing, and generating 
patterns of features, generalizing over these patterns when novel stems are encountered. 
R&M’s model is also good at explaining how irregularization errors are made (e.g. 
squeeze-->squoze), as the stem-stem and change-change patterns grow stronger and 
stronger into stage 3. It is argued, however, that R&M’s model fails to adequately explain 
how (i) regulars are stored and processed, (ii) novel verbs are regularized, (iii) 
regularization errors occur, and (iv) regulars appear to be immune to frequency effects 
(the connectionist model predicts that the more a stem gets processed, regardless o f its 
irregular/regular status, the quicker the discernment task will be).
R&M’s inadequate account of regular inflection necessitates (at least) a 
reassessment of unified lexicalist claims to non-modularity, and perhaps even a 
reassessment of the modeling potential of connectionist networks in general. Because the
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behavior o f R&M’s network is conditioned by frequency effects and regular-irregular 
ratios in the input, yet regular-irregular ratios can be radically different across 
individuals and cultures (Pinker, 1999: 234-5; also McCarthy & Prince, 1990; Omar, 
1973), R&M’s model might offer little more than an anecdotal account o f past tense 
formation. This, o f course, is a major blow to connectionist accounts, as they aim to 
account for the general constraints during language acquisition, constraints which 
determine the acquisition of rule-like behavior across individuals.
5.0 The “Bottleneck” Model:
Plunkett and Marchman (1993) provide an alternative phonology-only model, 
improving upon techniques used by R&M. By surveying the field of updated models 
(Plunkett & Marchman, 1991, 1993; MacWhinney & Leinbach, 1991; Daugherty & 
Seidenberg, 1994), we can be clear about which problems result from the nature o f 
unconstrained connectionist systems, and which result from inadequate modeling 
techniques. If we can demonstrate that the problems can be ironed out in newer networks, 
then much of the criticism focused on the nature of these models will dissipate. Only then 
can we be sure that we have a viable alternative to dual-route accounts.
Plunkett & Marchman (hereafter P&M) distinguish between macro and micro u- 
shaped learning. In the traditional account of u-shaped learning (Cazden, 1968; Ervin & 
Miller, 1963), which R&M duplicate, the transition to stage 2 is marked by indiscriminate 
overgeneralization of the regular suffix. P&M point out, though, that kids selectively 
overgeneralize only to a particular subset of irregulars (even ones produced correctly in
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stage 1), either on the basis of stem-stem similarities with other regulars (e.g. 
take—>taked), a lack o f sufficient stem-stem similarities with other /^regular patterns (e.g. 
catch—>catched), or strictly on a “best-guess” basis for stems without any telling 
likenesses (e.g. novel stems, ploamph—>ploamphed). Studies of naturalistic past tense 
usage (Marcus et al., 1992) and psychological elicitation tests (Marchman, 1988; 
Marchman & Plunkett, 1991) put the “regular rule imperialism” hypothesis to rest. These 
studies indicate that more of a micro effect occurs in stage 2 (i.e. discriminate 
overgeneralization).
Micro u-shaped learning of past tense has been successfully implemented in 
previous models (e.g. P&M, 1991), and this has been accomplished without any 
discontinuities in the training data, that is, no abrupt changes in vocabulary size and no 
skewed regular-irregular ratio. The results of this work suggest that the onset of 
overgeneralization errors in stage 2 follows not from manipulation of the training set (as in 
R&M’s model), but from competition between different change patterns in memory. The 
fact that kids overgeneralize the “-ed” rule in stage 2 does not stem from dual-mechanism 
architecture, in which the lexicon fa ils to retrieve the irregular and, in xnrn, fa ils to block 
the rule; rather, overgeneralization stems from the fact that kids have a single mechanism, 
and that different patterns in memory are competing for the use of its connections.
P&M’s model can thus be labeled the “bottleneck model” (see figure 5).
P&M’s project is to analyze the effects that incremental \Qaxrm% (Elman, 1991, 
1999) can have on the network’s performance. In the wake of their 1991 work, P&M fed 
their network a plausible training set, only this time around, instead of feeding stems one
54
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
by one at a more or less constant rate, they increased the numbers of tokens (and thereby 
types as well) incrementally. R&M’s training set went from 10 verbs to 420 verbs going 
into stage 2. P&M’s model, on the other hand, goes from 20 to 80 to 100 to 140 to 200 
to 260, on up to 500. Nor do P&M “blur” the input to enhance generalization. Thus, 
P&M resist the temptation to “force” the sorts of effects linked to the transition to stage 2. 
Instead, they allow the network to determine its own course of action.
The network does assume the micro u-shaped curve in the course of its learning, 
and ultimately succeeds at mapping novel verbs correctly over 90% of the time.
Qualitative changes in the network’s organization (stability of weight and threshold 
settings), and its very ability to model the micro u-shape, follow from incremental 
quantitative and structural changes in the verb vocabulary (changes in number of tokens 
and distribution of types). Grammatical structure thus emerges in P&M’s network. The 
domain-general processes of associative memory, in conjunction with a structured world 
{incremental input), elicit qualitative changes in an entirely different domain (inflection, 
linguistics).
5.1 Problems—
P&M skirt much of the difficulty arising from Wickelphonology. In their model, 
an artificial language is used to represent English verbs^. “Each verb in the dictionary 
consists of a consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) string, a CCV string or a VCC string.
^This might seem dubious, but for one, the artificial language follows English phonotactic constraints, and two, 
P&M’s results have been replicated in a number of other networks with units that encode actual English words 
(e.g. MacWhinney & Leinbach, 1991 ; Daugherty & Seidenberg, 1994).
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Each string is phonologically well-formed, even though it may not correspond to an actual 
English word” (30). Each stem is further set equal to a particular change class. Only 
those stems with the appropriate phonetic feature(s) are admitted into a particular change 
class, paralleling constraints on actual English stems. For example, if a stem ends in a 
[+cons, +dental] segment, it can either belong to the irregular “identity” (no change) class, 
e.g. hit-hit, or to the regular /-Id/ suffix class, e.g. pit-pitted. P&M then set this CVC 
stem (ending in a dental consonant) equal to one of the two applicable classes, and are 
therefore able to detect whether an error occurs in the output. Because P&M make the 
added modification that each phoneme be encoded featurally (rather than clusters of three 
as in R&M’s model), their network decomposes words much less arbitrarily—indeed, 
much more realistically—iha.n R&M’s. P&M’s network appears to organize itself much 
like Pinker (1999) suggests the lexicon organizes itself (i.e. according to “family 
resemblance,” see Wittgenstein’s PI). Distributed representations of words overlap where 
similar features are shared (e.g. “spring” and “sing” excite many of same nodes).
One of the few criticisms that P&M fall prey to is the homonym problem, but this 
may not be a genuine concern. MacWhinney & Leinbach address the homonym problem 
by encoding semantic features of the input. The counterargument is that semantics is an 
unreliable predictor of past tense (Pinker 1999; Kim et al., 1994). But is it as reliable as it 
needs to be? Let us assume that semantic extension gives us the right answer 50% of the 
time, on par on Pinker’s prediction of chance. Now if kids are aware that the root of flied  
in “fly the board” is the noun ‘fly,’ doesn’t this imply that they know flied  means 
something different from flew l Semantics may not be everything, but at least it accounts
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for some of the input. “Direct access” research (Cotrell & Plunkett, 1991), for instance, 
demonstrates that people occasionally compute past tense directly from meaning, with no 
recourse to the present tense form in memory. Could we at least, then, get the critics to 
agree on 60% odds, just slightly above chance?
Let us assume that our arguments have thus far been convincing, and that it is 
perfectly feasible that semantic extension could help us at least break chance odds. At this 
point, we turn to the child acquisition data (Kim et al., 1994) to see whether our 60% 
prediction is accurate. How often do kids regularize a verb with a non-central sense?
Only 64.1% o f the time (3-5 year olds. Experiment 2, p. 191), quite close to our 60% 
prediction. Odds like these hardly make a social science, and this is true in either 
direction. The merit of semantics as a solution to the homonym (and reduplication) 
problem is largely underdetermined in both accounts. It is dubious, therefore, that such a 
problem is indicative of anything more than inadequate modeling techniques.
There is one criticism, however, which P&M are clearly subject to. P&M set three 
different output units equal to the 3 different regular suffixes (/-Id/, /-t/, & /-d/). If  a novel 
stem does not fit into one of the patterns in memory, it gets assigned to the most 
probabilistic “sure bet”; after a certain degree of training, this would of course be the 
regular pattern (at least in English!). Which regular suffix unit fires depends, of course, on 
the stem-final feature (e.g. [+cons, +dental]—>/-Id/). Thus, the model appears to 
distinguish (albeit from our perspective) between stems and affixes, some crude form of 
morphology emerging from the network’s behavior. It also at least appears to be applying 
rules. Both “morphology” and “rules” emerge as by-products of the network’s
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subregularities, which themselves result from PDP association. The inclusion of suffix 
units, however, is arguably a manipulation of connectionist architecture. It “forces” 
affinity to the child regularization data. Regular endings are essentially “patched in,” and 
regularization of a given stem frequently occurs because memory cannot fit it into an 
irregular pattern.
The procedure goes as follows: when fed a novel stem, the network consults its 
database for family resemblance to other irregular stem-past tense pairs as well as to 
regulars (with regulars, the deciding factor is frequently their word-final feature); if an 
irregular “closest match” is found, the novel stem falls into the relevant irregular change 
class; if not, or if matched with a regular class based on similarities, the stem goes through 
more or less unaltered, that is, until it is finally outputted, in which case the appropriate 
regular suffix unit fires (i.e. no “blending” of features is necessary to manufacture most 
regular past tenses). Note that this is a similar process described by Pinker (1999). In 
Tinker’s account, if an irregular “closest match” is found in memory, it blocks the rule; 
otherwise the rule fires as a default. Thus, P&M are able to model the default status of 
the regular rule within the confines of a “single” mechanism, but at what cost?
P&M “patched in” these regular suffixes, and further, the distinction between stem 
and affix. They set out to provide an alternative to dual-mechanism approaches, yet 
ultimately commit themselves to dual architecture. If a separate group of units handle the 
most crucial aspect of the regularization task (i.e. suffixation), and these units are not 
directly involved in any correct irregular computation, then we can reasonably conclude 
that we have two separate mechanisms. The regular unit “patch” is essentially a sub-
58
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
mechanism of the larger neural net Because P&M “hard-wire” regular suffixes into their 
network’s output units, the regular suffixation change is frequently not even gem ratedhy  
the the mechanism that handles the irregulars (e.g. for “ploamph,” which has no 
overlapping features with patterns in memory). In fact, regularization often depends on 
the failure o f the network to find sufficient associations. Pinker (1999: 145) characterizes 
all such attempts as “shameful,” and he might have a case here. P&M’s modeling 
difficulties indicate the greater difficulty o f accurately modeling regular formation within 
the confines o f a single mechanism. P&M make no progress toward a coherent account of 
how regular past tenses are consistently computed (i.e. generated) by the same associative 
net that computes irregulars. In the “ploamph” example, it is the lack o f successful 
association that causes the appropriate regular unit to fire upon output. Thus, P&M make 
no progress in explicating the lexical associative mechanisms out of which regular 
inflectional grammar can be said to “emerge.”
6.0 The “Rules All the Way Down” Dual-Mechanism Model:
The seeds o f Pinker’s approach, which stands in opposition to single-mechanism 
approaches, lie in more traditional dual-mechanism (“dual-route”) accounts Chomsky 
and Halle (1968) subsume the lexicon under syntax, but clarify that lexical processes differ 
characteristically from syntactic processes. “The syntactic component of grammar 
contains a lexicon which lists lexical items and their inherent properties, in particular, 
those phonological properties that are not determined by general rule” (44). The lexicon 
is characterized as a list of formatives contained in a sub-module of syntax (e.g. boy, dog,
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and the associated concepts defining each*”), but only the idiosyncratic properties of these 
formatives are encoded. Any regularities in the lexicon are “extracted” by the grammar 
module, and subsumed under a particular set of rules.
Lexicon construction proceeds according to “lexical rules” which specify the way 
formatives are to be encoded. For example, lexical rules establish that walk (/wak/) takes 
the form “[v[ walk] pastjv” in the lexicon—subject to the regular past tense rule with a 
non-exceptional “past” diacritic—as opposed to take (/tek/), which takes the form 
“[v[ t*k]]v,” specifying irregular formation, or that the formative #tek# falls under some 
particular vowel change rule in the phonology module. Really, though, walk does not 
require a “past” tag at all. The very fact that it is not tagged for irregularity (as take is) is 
sufficient for the system to determine that it falls under the regular “default” rule. In fact, 
no regular past tenses can be found in Chomsky and Halle’s lexicon at all, only “untensed” 
root forms, inertly waiting higher-level rules to build them up into full-fledged 
morphosyntactic units (words, phrases, etc.).
Well-formedness rules specify the most minimal amount of structure required in 
the lexicon to keep irregulars from being regularized, and to specify the appropriateness of 
the regular rule elsewhere. Outside of lexical rules governing well-formedness (e.g. the 
necessary inclusion of the irregular past diacritic “*” and the unnecessary inclusion of 
diacritics for regulars), the lexicon per se accounts for little of the structure of language.
10
Boy and dog would actually be represented in the lexicon in symbolic form, encoding the relevant phonetic 
feature matrixes for each (see p. 9),
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It primarily consists of unrelated slots which get filled by representations for words. The 
actual vowel change that turns /tek/ into /tuk/, for example, falls under phonological
rather than lexical rules, so the lexicon alone establishes only what vowel change needs to 
occur, not how it occurs. Phonology takes the lexical representation as its input, and 
assigns to it a phonetic description according to universal, and hence (putatively) innate 
principles of phonology.
In the take example, “readjustment rules” (10-11), presumably at the interface of 
the lexicon and phonology, tweak the lexical representation “[v[tek] pastjv” into 
“[v[ t*k]]v,” flagging phonology to change the Id  to an /u/. Once the take-took change
rule is acquired, that is, as error rates fall in the third stage of u-shaped learning, the 
“[v[tek] pastjv” lexical entry gets overwritten by “[v[ t*kjjv,” providing more definitive 
information for the phonology module, and thus promoting more accurate and efficient 
processing of irregular past tense. Note, though, that Chomsky and Halle must assume 
that a critical mass of past experience with the irregular took must be reached before the 
generalization can be made that it gets the lexical diacritic In part, then, the rules for 
storing and forming irregulars do require learning, rather than being strictly “acquired,” 
and such learning must draw from general learning mechanisms (pattern associators) 
which make generalizations over data in memory.
The conclusion that acquiring the past tense took involves general learning 
mechanisms might seem controversial to critics of generative phonology, but Chomsky 
and Halle make it clear that their theory accommodates this fact. The grammar module in 
its entirety is linked to short and long-term memory (10), otherwise known as a 2-stage
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memory. Short-term memory operates in real-time, so it stores the input sequence for 
grammar mechanisms to access in the production of surface structures. Syntactic and 
phonological surface-structure representations of input sequences depend on short-term 
memory, whereas syntactic, phonological, lexical, and especially semantic d-structure 
representations draw from long-term databases. What makes the grammar module so 
efficient in its productive, rule-driven task is the fact that it need not be cluttered by 
idiosyncratic information (the lexicon handles this) nor by any information other than the 
rules themselves (general memory handles this). In the grammar module, rules “rule.” 
Insofar as the lexicon provides only minimal information about the phonological 
forms that a given stem can partake in (e.g. “telegraph,” “telegraphic,” and “telegraphy”), 
individual entries are stripped of unnecessary morphological and phonological baggage. In 
Chomsky & Halle’s lexicon (1968), the phonetic variations o f ‘telegraph,’ as in 
“telegraph,” “telegraphic,” and “telegraphy,” do not get separate entries. Only one entry 
(+tele+græf+) gets listed (encoded in a featural matrix), and the alternate phonetic
representations /téligræf/, /tclagræf/, and /tolégrif/ are generated by
morphological and phonological rules in separate modules. For example, assigning 
appropriate stress contours to the alternatives is not the business of the lexicon, but that of 
phonology (11-12).
With grammar being subserved by syntax and other highly rule-governed sub- 
modules, and the lexicon containing only minimal information, the source of linguistic 
structure on Chomsky and Halle’s view is clearly grammar proper. Chomsky and Halle 
present a fully modularized, serial symbol processor account of language processing par
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excellence. Syntax, along with its sub-modules—phonology, morphology, and the
lexicon—generate multi-level structural descriptions of input sequences (morphological &
lexical at the word level, syntactic at the phrasal & sentence level, and phonological at
both), by assigning to the sequences both a surface structure and a deep-structure. These
descriptions—represented by multi-level phrase-structure trees—are then fed to a semantics
module and assigned a semantic representation. Thus, speaker-to-hearer language
processing arrives at the end of its cycle, from the input, sound, to its output, meaning
(see figure 6). Because the rules for generating structural descriptions of input sequences
exploit variables (i.e. any eligible stem falls under the regular phonological change rule), in
other words, because grammatical processes are productive, an infinite number of possible
sound-meaning correspondences can be generated by Chomsky and Halle’s system.
The acquisition of specific grammatical operations like past tense can be
explicated, according to Chomsky and Halle, by pinpointing those productive rules which
govern regulars and irregulars. On this view, both regulars and irregulars are subject to
phonological rules. Most every change-change pattern in the lexicon (e.g. the o—>e
change pattern in flow-flew, blow-blew, grow-grew) can be collapsed into a small handful
of austere rules which specify particular feature changes to a given irregular stem. Take
for example the rise-rose and take-took changes.
If  we take the present tense form as the underlying form, we must assign the 
lexical representations / r i z / ,  /tæ k/, respectively, which give [ ra y z ] , [ të y k ]  in 
the usual way. To derive the past tense forms, we first apply a rule shifting 
backness and rounding, which is widely applicable to irregular verbs and other 
irregular forms...This gives [rü z ], [tok]. Diphthongization and Vowel Shift give 
[rowz], [tôw k]. Finally, reapplication of the Vowel Shift rule gives the forms
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[rôwz], [tûwk], (202)
Only two rules, one being applied recursively, are needed to account for the rise-rose and 
take-took change. In this case, the diacritic in the lexical entries “[v[ r*z]]v” and 
“[v[t*k]]v” not only signifies which phonological laws the stem falls under in past tense 
formation, but further that the stem requires two cycles of the Vowel Shift rule.
6.1 Problems—
Cling-clung, tell-told, biïid-bomid, break-broke changes all follow an instance of 
the Vowel Shift rule [-back]—>[+back, +round], as well as rwi-ran and hold-held 
([+back]—>[-back, -round]). Eat-ate, choose-chose, sing-sang, sit-sat changes all fall 
under the Lowering Ablaut rule ([+high]—>[-high]), bear-bore follows a Backing Ablaut 
rule (mid front vowel —> mid back vowel), and flee-jled, shoot-shot fall under the 
Shortening Ablaut rule (long vowel —> short). In total, nearly 165 irregular verbs are 
generated by only 3 phonological rules (Pinker, 1999: 92). The economy of the “rules all 
the way down” model is striking, but it comes at a price.
Chomsky and Halle discount the even more traditional view that all irregulars are 
learned bottom-up (rote). Chomsky and Halle see verbs sitting on a continuum from 
completely regular on one extreme (walk-walked) to completely irregular on the other (go- 
went, be-was). Irregulars formed by suppletion (go-went) are memorized outright by 
general cognitive mechanisms, then stored in the lexicon as “[v[went] past]v”; fully regular 
verbs are generated by general rule, regular past tense forms not being stored in the 
lexicon; and verbs “less” irregular than go-went are generated by more specific rules (as
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with the ing-ang-ung change-change family), being stored in the lexicon with the 
appropriate irregular change tag (e.g. “*”)
Chomsky and Halle’s characterization of the non-suppleted irregulars (in other 
words, most irregulars) is nevertheless doubly problematic. First, the Vowel Shift rule, 
and its sub-rules, Lowering, Backing, and Shortening Ablaut, all follow from a troubled 
assumption, that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” (Pinker, 1999) in the minds of 
modern day speakers. Take for example the flee-jled  change. Chomsky and Halle handle 
this example with the Shortening Ablaut rule, which specifies where “[v[fl*]]v” occurs in 
the lexicon, make the change [+long]—>[-long]. Enter the troubled assumption. The ee 
sound in “flee” is wof just a drawn out, longer version of the e sound in “fled.” These are 
qualitatively different vowels, /i/ being high and tense (plus a /y/ sound usually follows, 
creating a diphthong—/fliyd/), and /e / being mid and lax. “Long” vowel and “short” vowel
“have been misnomers in English at least since the Great Vowel Shift in the fifteenth 
century, when people scrambled the pronunciation of vowels” (Pinker, 1999: 95). As 
people “scrambled” vocalic pronunciations more and more over time, the less and less 
applicable became rules for manipulating specific qualities of vowels.
Chomsky and Halle argue that d-structures must be stored in our lexicons— 
otherwise we run into the problem of M>hich s-structure to store (see “telegraph” example). 
The Vowel Shift rule applies because the d-structure for a stem like flee  in modern brains 
is more or less identical to the d-structure in Chaucer’s brain! “According to the 
Chomsky-Halle theory, the mental representations of words in different centuries over the 
past millennium, and in all modern dialects, are the same; English has changed primarily by
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adding phonological rules” (Pinker, 1999: 98). Because we have d-structures stored in 
our lexicons, vocalic pronunciations from before the Great Vowel Shift are preserved, so 
the Vowel Shift rule still applies as it did 600 years ago. But unless Chomsky and Halle 
can produce convincing evidence that kids in modern times are routinely exposed to the 
Middle English pronunciations of irregulars (which is altogether unfounded), Chomsky 
and Halle must claim that the construction of d-structure is informed by innate knowledge 
of vowel qualities from before the Great Vowel Shift (which is equally untenable— 
evolution at an unprecedented rate).
The second problem with Chomsky and Halle’s model is that it cannot account for 
the irregular data. Irregulars are inundated with stem-stem and change-change similarities, 
or patterns: blow-blew, grow-grew, know-hiew, throw-threw; bind-bound, fwd-found, 
grind-ground, wind-wound; drink-drank, shrink-shrank, sink-sank, stink-stank; bear- 
bore, swear-swore, tear-tore, wear-wore. Moreover, these patterns seem to be productive 
in some sense (at least semi-productive). Dive found itself resisting its regularity in the 
early part of this century, and ultimately fell into the i—>o change pattern on analogy with 
drive-drove, now the proper past tenses are “dived” (unusual in the U.S.) a W “dove” (the 
usual version). Caught, cost, flung, knelt, quit, slung, stuck, and strung were all lured by 
irregular patterns within the last few centuries (Jespersen, 1942). Diachronic shifts such 
as these suggest that the lexicon is more like a pattern associator than a list of unrelated 
slots.
Kids and adults alike inevitably make irregularization errors {squeeze-squoze on 
analogy with freeze-froze, bite-bote, bring-brang, trick-truck, see Xu & Pinker, 1992; also
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Pinker, 1999). Given nonsense stems with stem-stem similarities to genuine irregulars like 
spling, people are easily seduced by the irregular ing-ang-ung family and produce splang 
as a past tense (Bybee and Moder, 1983)‘V Evidently, then, the lexicon is not just an 
inert, idiosyncratic “list” of items, but a mechanism hungry for patterns, one that literally 
generates these patterns by detecting regularities in the input. The lexicon must thus 
account for more of the structure in past tense formation than traditionally thought.
Lexical structure of this nature cannot be “distilled out” in the form of rules. “No rule can 
cleanly pick out the i—>u verbs, which is why Chomsky, Halle, [and Mohanan] didn’t 
bother looking for conditions that triggered each rule but resorted to listing the verbs 
individually” (Pinker, 1999; 102-3). Following the advice of Bybee & Slobin (1982), 
Pinker therefore settles on fam ily resemblance categories for irregular clusters, as rigid 
rules are not flexible enough to accommodate irregular changes (e.g. sling—>slung though 
spring—> sprang).
Chomsky and Halle’s model predicts not a drop of systematicity for lexical 
processes (i.e. that lexical association of a stem with patterns in memory might “seduce” 
that stem into a particular change class). Generalization o f a particular change rule is not 
handled by the lexicon in Chomsky and Halle’s account, but by the grammar module. 
Nevertheless, it is dubious that novel irregulars are generated by a general rule. A general 
rule of this nature (part o f competence proper) would be too rigid for irregular change
'^Experiments like Bybee & Moder’s suggest that these errors are not just performance errors, but a result of 
competence, as they are “teased out” of the participants. Chomsky would clearly include the KOL kids bring to 
these experiments in the domain of competence, but would qualify that splang is generated by rule (at least in 
the 1968 literature). Only exceptionless rules fit into the domain of competence proper (see also Givon, 1999).
67
Reproduced witfi permission of tfie copyrigfit owner. Furtfier reproduction profiibited witfiout permission.
class discriminations (errors o f commission would occur, e.g. “bring” would be incorrectly 
admitted to the ing-ang family). If Chomsky and Halle included general conditions 
designating when and only when a specific change should occur for a particular irregular 
cluster, they could rightly say that generalization is what causes novel irregular structures.
But because they list these conditions for each verb individually, they forfeit the model’s 
ability to generalize to novel irregulars (i.e. to “stereotype”). Thus, contrary to Chomsky 
and Halle’s account, irregulars are best described as being learned bottom-up (on 
analogy—by association—or by rote memorization, see Pinker, 1999; also Aronoff, 1975), 
due to the fact that rigidly designated rules cannot account for irregular family 
membership.
Moreover, it is not even clear that the lexicon stores word-rule associations at all 
when it comes to irregular verbs. “Bybee & Slobin (1982) point out that speech errors 
occurring when irregular past tenses are elicited are virtually always existing but incorrect 
English words (e.g. rise-raise), never novel rule products (e.g. rise-rewsey (Pinker & 
Prince, 1988: 333). These results demonstrate the lexicon’s prowess at storing word- 
word associations (hence “raise” for the past tense of “rise”), but demonstrate no such 
ability when it comes to word-rule associations. Chomsky and Halle can thus account for 
the regulars, and for regularization errors, that is, until kids have enough experience under 
their belts, the lexical entry for “take” remains “[v[ take] pastjv” (no diacritic), so it falls 
under the general rule; but they fall short of an adequate account of irregular verbs and 
irregularization errors. Chomsky and Halle cannot adequately account for (i) the way in 
which irregulars are formed (due to the first problem with d-structure), (ii) stem-stem and
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change-change patterns in the lexicon (due to the second problem, their characterization 
of the lexicon), and (iii) irregularization errors (due again to the second problem).
7.0 A Convergent Perspective;
The only way to get a clear grasp on how the lexicon and grammar interact and are 
implemented in the brain is to study specific grammatical operations, paying close 
attention to the sorts o f processing each seems to demand. Rumelhart and McClelland 
(1986) and Plunkett and Marchman (1991, 1993) claim that irregular and regular past 
tense verbs can each be handled by the same mechanism, that is, by the same neural 
processor (a pattern associator memory, or PDP). On the other side of the debate. Pinker 
(1999) argues that the lexicon and grammar (and at a finer grain of detail, “words and 
rules”) are mediated by different sorts of neural processors, concentrating specifically on 
the inflectional system (morphology module). Most of Pinker’s data specifically targets 
the English past tense and nominative plural systems, but studies have been replicated in a 
variety of other languages (e.g. Arabic and German; Pinker, 1999: 211-239).
On the surface, English irregular verbs appear to be a grab-bag bunch whose rules 
for past tense formation are fossils from before the Great Vowel Shift (“strong” verbs), or 
whose rules have been corrupted over time (e.g. burned—>burnt, dived—>dove). But 
when we look closer, there is a significant amount of structure in the lexicon which has 
traditionally been neglected. Rules for forming the past tense of strong verbs before the 
Great Vowel Shift appear as “artifacts,” or patterns in the lexicons of modern day 
speakers resulting from stem-stem and change-change similarity between strong verbs that
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have held strong, as it were, to the test of time. Before the Great Vowel Shift, English 
speakers produced the past tense of strong verbs by rule (ablaut), top-down, whereas 
during and after the Shift, the phonological rules for past tense formation became 
increasingly more inapplicable, so past tense forms for these verbs needed to be learned 
more and more bottom-up (i.e. memorized rote or via association, not generated by rule). 
Most strong verb past tense forms find their way into the modem day speakers’ lexicons in 
a more or less bottom-up fashion.
When it comes to irregular past tense verbs, the degree of structure they exhibit 
paints a less traditional portrait o f the lexicon. Stem-stem and change-change similarities 
between irregulars form basic structures (or patterns) in the lexicon, and these patterns 
seem to have some rule-like qualities, as in the dived/dove example. For many modern 
day speakers (whose dialect seldom puts “dived” to use), the production of the past tense 
“dived” is blocked because “dove” has been memorized and is clustered in the lexicon with 
other verb forms of similar patterns. For speakers of dialects including both uses, “dove” 
is either generated by phonological rule (which is unlikely, see previous section) or on 
analogy with verbs in the i—>o change pattern. The latter phenomenon falls out quite 
naturally from the model, so long as we consider the lexicon as a type of pattern 
associator.
Because efficient pattern recognition is a characteristic shortcoming of rule-driven 
serial symbol processors (Bechtel, 1988), it is an unlikely candidate for English irregular 
verbs. “It has not been easy to develop rule-based processing systems with good pattern 
recognition abilities, in part because such recognition requires the machine to be able to
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deal with an enormous number of contextual clues, whose relevance may differ from 
context to context” (Bechtel, 1988: 262). Because the categorization of a novel irregular 
stem depends on recognition of an appropriate change pattern (based on contextual cues), 
a serial symbol processor would not be an efficient mechanism for irregulars. A rule-based 
serial symbol processor operates according to necessary and sufficient conditions for 
category membership, what Givon (1999) calls “Platonic categories.” A serial symbol 
processor would thus have considerable trouble handling the fiizzy categorical status of 
irregular “families,” or clusters. Thus, departing from Chomsky and Halle’s (1968) view 
that irregular formation boils down to a few stripped-down, austere rules. Pinker suggests 
that it is handled by a type of pattern associator memory, or parallel distributed processor.
When we look at regular past tense formation, on the other hand, it appears to be 
a highly rule-governed process, and less constrained connectionist networks model it 
inaccurately. Egedi and Sproat (1991) beefed up (not “beff up”) the connectionist model 
of past tense, ridding it of problematic Wickelphonology (as do Plunkett&Marchman,
1993; MacWhinney & Leinbach, 1991; and Daugherty and Seidenberg, 1994). They 
added a hidden-layer for more complex computational abilities (“internal 
representations”^̂ ), and a training set based on acceptable ratios and numbers of regular 
and irregular verbs. Unlike P&M, Egedi & Sproat did not hard-wire, or “patch in,” the 
regular suffix, so the same nodes and connections mediated both regular and irregular
hidden layer of units enables networks to construct internal representations, usually using different 
groupings of features than input representations. Because it provides additional and slightly different featural 
representations, the network has more raw data to work with (i.e. to associate). Thus, with a hidden layer, the 
likelihood increases that if there are regularities to be exploited, they will be detected and recorded by the 
network. Units in the hidden layer are connected only to input and/or output units, and thus receive no external
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
inflections. The network generalized change patterns to irregular stems as effectively as 
humans, but failed miserably at the regulars, leading the researchers (and Pinker, 1999) to 
conclude that different sorts of processors are required for regulars and irregulars. Egedi 
and Sproat’s network (i) assigned to regular stems the “zero” suffix when a change should 
have been made, (ii) confused regular input stems with other regulars {train—> trailed, 
speak—>smoked, glow—>glanced, conflict—>conflated), and (iii) about 25% of the time, 
produced unpredictable, almost unimaginable errors like wink—>wok, yield—>rilt, 
satisfy—>sedderded, and quiver—>qness (145). The network simply misrepresents the 
way regular verbs are computed. Regular inflections result from suffixation, not from 
“blending” features associatively.
Pinker (1999) interprets the network’s inadequacy with respect to regular verbs to 
be indicative that the connectionist model itself is incomplete. In the symbol processing 
account, the regular rule, as a default, exploits variables to predict the proper past tense. 
Any  stem is eligible for the rule once it gets inputted into the rule box (even the stem 
‘input,’ whose root form takes the irregular), which is precisely why the past tense of 
“take,” for example, occasionally comes out “tooked” in child speech error data (Brown, 
1973). The “rule box” is more or less unaffected by which stem it gets fed—precisely why 
the input “took” does not block the rule in producing “tooked.” The regular rule does not 
discriminate; it fires ballistically (all or nothing). Because symbol processors exploit 
variables in just such a fashion, and because rules in symbol processors designate ballistic.
stimuli.
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serial operations (X—>Y/_), rules appear to be implemented in very different neural 
hardware than words. Regulars are thus generated top-down (generated by rule), from a 
symbol processor that takes eligible stems as input and serially copies them (with the 
appropriate phonological alterations), then adds “-ed” (/-Id/, /-t/, or /-d/). Irregulars, on 
the other hand, are handled by a pattern associator, learned and generated from memory in 
a more or less bottom-up fashion. What makes Pinker’s model so efficient is that his 
lexicon is uncluttered by regular past tense forms, saving much needed time when the 
database is searched for a match.
The procedure for formulating past tense in Pinker’s account goes as follows: a 
verb stem is inputted in parallel to the two main components of the inflectional system (the 
lexicon and grammar); the lexicon, a sort of associative memory, scans its database for 
similar stems which fall into a given change pattern; if a “closest match” is found, the stem 
gets generalized to that class, and the output of the rule mechanism, a serial symbol 
processor, is blocked—an irregular past tense form is outputted; if no similarities are found 
during the search, the regular rule fires. Thus, past tense forms for regulars need not be 
stored. Indeed, it is precisely the absence of regular stem forms in memory that triggers 
the application of the default rule. (See figure 4.)
Because generative rules of grammar are too rigid (exceptionless) for the 
irregulars, yet a system devoid of rules (or further constraints) cannot adequately account 
for the regulars, a hybrid position between Chomsky & Halle’s and Rumelhart & 
McClelland’s seems to be in store when it comes to past tense formation. Regular past 
tense formation is best described as being mediated by a serial processor, which uses top-
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down information (representations, “word=stem+affix” templates, “blocking” mechanisms 
etc. whereas irregular past tense formation is best described as being mediated by a 
parallel distributed processor, using primarily bottom-up processes, with no explicit rules 
or pre-set weights, although connections can be altered, or strengthened, when a verb is 
adopted into a particular pattern. In other words, irregulars are memorized rote, and 
regulars are generated by rule. At the psychological level, a hybrid view makes sense 
because it does not entail what Pinker calls “jiggery-pokery,” or “fudging,” in trying to 
model child past tense learning accurately.
7.1 Problems—
Pinker's model predicts frequency effects for the irregulars, but not for regulars. 
Subjects in one experiment, for example, produced infrequent irregulars much more slowly 
than frequent ones, but the same result failed to hold for regulars (Pinker, 1999: 129). 
Since regular past tenses are not stored, there would be no delay in applying the rule due 
to tenuous memory traces. Daugherty and Seidenberg (1994), however, demonstrate that 
frequency actually can affect a certain class of regular verbs, which they label the “regular 
but inconsistent” class. Verbs like hake-baked that have close irregular neighbors in 
phonological space (e.g. take-took) are, in fact, sensitive to frequency. Pinker (1999)
’^These need not be representatiomlly innate to the extent Elman ( 1999) suggests. Take, for example, the 
blocking mechanism, which can be explained with recourse to local and global architectural constraints (less 
direct), or with recourse to functional pressures on developing brains for both rapid and attended processing 
(for rules and words, respectively).
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stipulates that bake-baked is “attracted” by stem-stem similarities into the /e/—>/u/ change
class, and thereby stored in the lexicon. Doublet past tenses must be stored as well, 
otherwise it would be impossible to produce both forms; for example, the past tense form 
dreamt would always block the production of dreamed. So now we have all doublets 
{slit/slitted, dreamed/dreamt) plus all “regular but inconsistent” past tense forms in the 
lexicon. The problem becomes clear when we sit down and list all the words that this 
would include.
Slit/slitted, rid/ridded, dreamed/dreamt, dived/dove, braked (broke), baked (took), 
blinked (drank), pitted (hit), flitted  (hit), shit/shat/shitted, lied (lay), squeezed (froze), 
sneezed (froze), faked  (broke), ached (broke), caked (broke), showed (grew), bowed 
(grew), mowed (grew), towed (grew), flowed (grew), dinged (brang), pinged (brang), 
winged (brang), flaked (took), bared (bore), cared (bore), shared (bore), paired (bore), 
pared (bore), fared  (bore), pined (found), wined (found), dined (found), minded (found), 
and the list goes on, must all be stored. Furthermore, any time a novel verb is encountered 
that is phonologically similar to an irregular stem-stem similarity class, it too is stored.
This paints a much different picture o f the lexicon, one shot through with exceptional 
regular past tenses. The sheer bulk of intermediary cases indicates that our “regular” 
classification cannot be as rigid as Pinker makes it out to be. Yet rigid classification of 
regulars is precisely what a serial symbol processor demands for efficient computation (i.e. 
“Platonic categories”). Daugherty and Seidenberg (hereafter D&S) see this as an 
indication that we need to abandon the “rules and exceptions” approach to grammar, 
exemplified by Pinker (1999) for the regular past tense. They instead adopt a “continuum
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of regularity” view. Unlike Chomsky & Halle’s “continuum of regularity,” however, 
D&S’s is not rule-governed in the tradional sense. More of a “prototypical” rule seems to 
be in order for the regulars, rather than an exceptionless rule of grammar (see Givon,
1999; also Rosch, 1975). The most regular set of regulars (those without similar-sounding 
irregulars) would be clustered closest to the mean (e.g. talk-talked), and the “regular but 
inconsistents” would define the next circle out (e.g. bake-baked), and so on until we get to 
the least frequent “regular but inconsistent” verb, the one that takes the longest to 
produce.
According to D&S, Pinker’s solution to the “regular but inconsistent” problem is 
ad hoc. “Note that there is no independent basis for assuming that the ‘associative net’ 
will necessarily exhibit this property [the attraction of “regular but inconsistents”]; it is 
merely stipulated as a means for handling some novel behavioral facts” (D&S, 1994: 382). 
In the dual-route theory, there is no basis for distinguishing “pure” regulars from “regular 
but inconsistent” types. The efficacy of Tinker’s blocking mecanism (and lexical look-up) 
appears to be in jeopardy. Pinker cannot explain how squoze is frequently produced 
without admitting that his model suffers inherent mechanical shortcomings (i.e. false-alarm 
blocking). Moreover, he cannot account for frequency effects on “regular but 
inconsistents” without claiming that all such past tenses (and doublets) are stored in the 
lexicon—a move which seems to fly in the face of his own lexical storage criterion (i.e. 
//regularity).
In connectionist models, however, the “regular but inconsistent” phenomenon falls 
out naturally because the same weights are being used to compute both irregulars and
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regulars. Because Pinker cannot account for such a large class of regular verbs (without 
recourse to ad hoc stipulation), it is questionable that connectionist accounts are parasitic 
of symbolic accounts, as he claims elsewhere on similar grounds (Pinker & Prince, 1988). 
In point o f fact, it might be the case that the relation holds the other way around. At least 
part o f Pinker’s project needs to be devoted to explicating the lower-level mechanisms 
that ground his higher-level theory of language cognition (see “Discussion” section).
Another problem Pinker inevitably faces is that o f vagueness. Throughout his 
writings (Pinker&Prince, 1988, 1994; Pinker, 1989, 1994, 1999), Pinker suggests that a 
variety of past tense phenomena are consequences of innate architecture. He alludes to 
many such innate mechanisms—“word=stem+affix” templates, templates specifying lexical 
categories (N, V, Adj.), and the blocking mechanism—but his account of how these are 
innate (i.e. type o f innateness) is lacking (see Elman, 1999), nor does he explain how these 
so-called “templates” are implemented. Elman himself appears to have trouble pinning 
Pinker down—though he eventually categorizes him as a representational nativist (1999;
3). Even where Pinker refers to “representations” (e.g. “word=stem+afFix” templates, 
blocking principles), he fails to explain how they got there. He does appeal to natural 
selection (e.g. Pinker, 1994), but natural selection per se is blind to distinctions between 
direct and indirect genetic encoding, only ensuring that a given behavior gets replicated, 
not specifically how or to what extent genes code for it. The quote Elman cites as 
evidence that Pinker is a representationalist (from Pinker, 1994: 93, 97) contains vague 
talk of “instinct,” a “certain wiring of microcircuitry,” but it does not clarify to what extent 
genes have a role in ensuring this “wiring.” Pinker is working at such a high level of
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description, it is unclear whether he has a specific neurological framework in mind; in turn, 
he fails to provide a coherent neural-level interpretation of his theory. Pinker sufficiently 
understates the lower-level implications of his theory to ward off any stereotypes, but this 
is an obvious problem for those outside the field of psychology, who want an empirically 
grounded account o f innate constraints they can “sink their teeth into.”
Pinker’s account o f past tense is beneficial, though, in exposing “tricks” used by 
modelers, making explicit the requirements for an adequate model of past tense. It does 
seem that kids and adults alike cue on more than just sound when determining past tense. 
Further, there is marked evidence that children cue on the structure of words, not only on 
sound (and semantics). Moreover, most regulars do appear to be immune to frequency 
effects, which might mean they follow a rule with variables, the hallmark of a symbol 
processor; that is, because any stem is acceptable, the rule does not hesitate, even for the 
most infrequently used verbs. Connectionist accounts have thus far failed to explicate 
various higher level phenomena (e.g. the fact that kids say “flied” in Kim’s test as often as 
they do). At the psychological level, a description of how children come to form past 
tense in connectiotiist terms is inadequate. Children simply do not appear to process 
regular past tense the way Rumelhart and McClelland’s model does.
(See figure 7 for a summary of the phenomena to be explained for past tense and 
how each model handles the explanation.)
8.0 Discussion:
Although Pinker, Prince, Kim, Egedi and Sproat all work to establish the need for
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a modular system at the functional (psychological, cognitive) level, we do not have to rule 
out the possibility that at the neural (or implementational) level, the processor used for 
regulars might in fact be a PDP. Pinker himself fails to adequately explain how his higher- 
level theory can be applied at the lower level, yet connectionism accomplishes just such a 
task (i.e. mediation, see Smolensky, 1986). Akin to P&M’s “patching in” of regular units, 
we would have to include a highly constrained PDP, but it is indeed possible to have 
“modules” ofPDPs (i.e. multi-layered processing). PDP modeling is by no means 
synonymous with, or committed to, single-mechanism hypotheses (nor is it committed to 
entirely open-ended, unconstrained computation). For our purposes, one module, a less 
constrained PDP, would handle the irregulars, which would be stored both in stem and 
past tense form. A sub-module, a highly constrained PDP, would be inputted with the 
relevant verb-stem in parallel, and would be dedicated to processing regulars. If the less 
constrained PDP cannot find an irregular match, the highly constrained PDP’s prediction 
shines through; if it can find a match, the constrained PDPs output portals are blocked (a 
la Pinker's blocking mechanism*'*). The regular suffix would thus be assigned as a default, 
so no regular past tense forms would need to be stored. We could also build semantic and 
morphological units (or layers) into the model.
Such a model would account for the lack of frequency effects on most regulars, yet 
reserve the possibility that frequency might affect “regular but inconsistent” verbs. The
*'*Actually, this is not exactly ‘Tinker’s” blocking mechanism. His version comprises part of a domain-specific 
system, but the system described here is inherently domain-general (although it may specialize in language- 
related computations). Functional pressures for both rapid and attended processing in general (see Givon, 
1999) could easily account for modularization effects that occur in one’s lifetime (see B&G, p. 64). Or it might 
be the case that the blocking mechanism is in fact innate; still, we can account for this fact with recourse to less
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theory predicts a critical window of time during which an appropriate irregular pattern can 
be located, after which the rule inevitably gets applied (e.g. for “ploamph,” after a certain 
time spent unsuccessfully searching for an irregular match, the system’s default would 
apply). Because regular but inconsistents share phonologically similar featural sets with 
irregulars (stem-stem), it would take longer for the lexicon to determine whether there is 
sufficient featural overlap to warrant blocking the rule. The lexicon, a type of pattern 
associator, “attracts” regular but inconsistents into irregular patterns. Our options are as 
follows: one, either stipulate this feature of our model (i.e. the attraction and subsequent 
delay with regular but inconsistents due to lexical association), and further, accept the 
inevitability o f dual architecture in accounting for the data, or two, be completely ignorant 
of the facts o f past tense inflection—that we attune ourselves to the structure of words as 
well as to sound, that regulars are flat botched by Egedi & Sproat’s network, that regulars 
would be mental “baggage” if stored like irregulars, that most regulars are immune to 
frequency effects, and so on.
Pinker can get away with stipulation for regular but inconsistents because he views 
the lexicon as a type of associative net, inherently generating patterns, attracting candidate 
stems to applicable classes. “The words-and-rules theory predicts only that people don’t 
depend on stored [regular] past-tense forms, not that they are incapable of storing them” 
(Pinker, 1999: 137). If a regular past tense stem has too much featural overlap, it must be 
stored, otherwise it would cause the inflectional system considerable “noise” each time it
direct genetic inscription (e.g. local and/or global architectural constraints, see Elman, 1999).
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gets inputted. The promptness of the rule’s firing, moreover, is contingent upon the 
promptness of the lexicon’s decision procedure. During and after stage 3, verbs like bake, 
for example, would cause less delay than rarer verbs like pare, due to the fact that the 
memory trace to bake's featural representation would be much stronger. The more 
frequently a regular but inconsistent verb is processed, the less delay the lexicon has in 
fitting it into an appropriate pattern. Regulars that are not inconsistent would be 
computed without excess delay (i.e. just the amount of time it takes for the irregular 
processor to realize there is no match). Conversely, then, another prediction is that the 
more overlapping features a regular but inconsistent stem has with irregular patterns in 
memory, the longer it will take to compute its past tense (up to a certain “critical” point, 
when the default operation fires). These predictions, based on a positive correlation 
between frequency and processing speed, have been confirmed in experiments on 
“parallel-race” theory (Baayen & Schrender, 1995; Baayen, Dijkstra, and Schrender,
1997).
There is further evidence for a dual-mechanism from a neurolinguistic perspective 
Rhee, Ullman, and Pinker (1999) used MEG (Magnetoencephalographic) technology to 
chart the neural regions that “light up” when past tense is formed in non-impaired brains. 
About a quarter of a second after the initial stimulus (an English verb stem), left temporal 
and parietal regions light up for both regulars and irregulars alike. About a tenth o f a 
second later, left frontal regions light up, but only when the stimulus is a regular stem. 
These results are compatible with the dual-mechanism account. For both regular and 
irregular stems, the lexicon is scanned for a match (the process shown by the first recorded
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pattern of neural activity); if a match is found, the rule is blocked (explaining the lack of 
dual neural activity for irregulars); if not, the regular rule fires in a separate mechanism 
(the process shown by the second recorded pattern of neural activity). These data lend 
support to Pinker’s claim that “rules” (for regular suffixation) and “words” (for irregular 
formation) are subserved by separate mechanisms implemented in different specialization 
regions of the brain
In effect, we would be forfeiting the single mechanism hypothesis, adopting a 
modularized system (i.e. multi-layered), but we would not necessarily be forfeiting the 
claim to domain-generality. The reason why it is exceedingly difficult for neuroscientists 
to pinpoint domain-specific neural language mechanisms is due to a larger issue of 
plasticity. Because the brain is plastic, individuals suffering brain damage to one region of 
cortex can lose a specific ability, yet after some time, recover the function utilizing neural 
mechanisms in an entirely different cortical r e g i o n A f t e r  hemispherectomy, for example, 
split-brain patients can potentially recover language abilities in their right hemisphere 
(Gazzaniga, 1983), even though for most people so-called “language sites” are located in 
the left hemisphere. Neurological studies have also revealed that left hemisphere regions 
traditionally thought to control language processing also subserve other /?o/?-linguistic 
tasks, like the planning of motor sequences (see Kimura, 1976) and “analytic” processing 
(see Bradshaw & Nettleton, 1981).
Merzenich et al. (1983) mapped cortical sites to specific hand movements and
*^This is potentially an example of both multiple realizability’ (MR) and context dependence (CD). One 
unitary higher-level function can be implemented in widely multifarious neurological sites and states (MR). 
Moreover, neural sites and states may take on additional functions previously un-mappable to them (CD).
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sensations in owl monkeys, after damage to these sites, previously “silent” clusters of 
neurons assumed the responsibility of controlling the monkey’s hand. In a series of 
experiments, O’Leary et al. (1989, 1993) transplanted fetal plugs of cortical tissue from 
one specialization region into an altogether different region, and surprisingly, the 
transplanted neural tissue assumed the appropriate neurophysiological configuration for 
each novel context. As Sejnowski puts it, “the relatively uniform structure of cerebral 
cortex suggests that it is capable of applying a general-purpose style o f computation to 
many processing domains...” (1986: 372)'^. The logic of the brain is not as restrictive as 
the logic o f linguists, who, for ease of study, divide linguistic functions cleanly into distinct 
domains (Deacon makes a similar argument, 1997). Even if cortical regions specialize in 
one domain of processing, we cannot make the additional claim that these regions are 
domain-specific (i.e. innately constrained to mediate one and only one class of stimuli).
At this point in our science, we are not even certain to what extent localization is a 
function of genes or environment (Caplan, 1987: 456), let alone domain-specificity.
Nevertheless, Pinker indicates that domain-specificity and serial symbol 
architecture are characteristic of the brain, not just the mind (Pinker, 1994; Pinker, 1999: 
241-68).
So our ability to tie the steps of language processing to circuits in the brain is still 
rudimentary. For now we must settle for something simpler: clues that regular 
and irregular words depend on different sets of brain systems. . . and clues that 
irregulars depend more on the system for word memory and regulars more on the
an even finer grain of detail, neurons themseh'es are able to convey a variety of different contents 
(multifunctionality). Hebb (1949) pioneered this idea, but refer also to Edelman (1989; 50), a single group 
[of neurons] can participate in more than one kind of signaling function.”
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system for rules. (1999; 243)
How are we to interpret such a “system for rules?” If there is a system in the brain whose 
operations depend on explicit unconscious rules (as argued 1999: 1-239 for cognition), we 
have evidence that Pinker’s higher-level theory of regular formation is an implemented 
theory (or at least it presents itself as one). But if his higher level theory of cognition is an 
implemented theory, then “innate KOL,” “domain-specificity,” “explicit unconscious 
rules,” and “serial symbol processing” can all be taken as descriptions of the brain. At the 
neural level, however, these descriptions would be entirely inaccurate.
The neurological evidence suggests that rigid domain-specificity cannot be 
imposed upon neural mechanisms subserving language. If, as Pinker projects (1994, Ch. 
10), 98% of all language related disorders result from impairment of some site along the 
sylvian fissure in the left hemisphere, clearly language is localized across most individuals; 
we can even go so far as to say that perisylvian regions specialize in language-related 
computations, that is, that these regions primarily subserve language but also (or 
otherwise) serve other classes of stimuli. But it is quite another thing for language to be 
domain-specific, implemented in neural mechanisms that can only serve linguistic stimuli, 
and the evidence clearly does not stack in this direction. Inflectional abilities are impaired 
in agrammatic aphasies with damage near Broca’s area, for example, yet the same patients 
can exhibit impairment to systems involved in a number of won-linguistic tasks (Erhard, 
Kato, Strick, & Ugurbil, 1996). SLI patients also suffer setbacks on a number of different 
general cognitive tasks, not only on tasks specific to language (Johnson, 1994; Thai & 
Katich, 1996; Townsend, Wulfeck, Nichols, & Koch, 1995). Thus, the neural mechanisms
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subserving language must at least partly be involved in various general cognitive functions 
(assuming there is no undiagnosed damage elsewhere).
In the new theory, a particular sub-set of general cognitive mechanisms would be 
recruited for symbolic-style computations (based on hundreds o f thousands of years of 
computing highly regular patterns if we want to go this far, or simply based on 
modularization effects that occur in one’s lifetime, see B&G, p. 64). Modularity effects of 
this nature would satisfy the cognitive need for both rapid (highly constrained) and 
attended (less constrained) processing (again, see Givon, 1999). This would be 
“implementational connectionism” (see Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988), 
invalidating the claim to “eliminative connectionism,” but it would nevertheless emphasize 
the fact that PDPs are our best available models of how higher-level symbolic operations 
are implemented at the lower level (i.e in local processes). On such a view, regular past 
tense structures could rightly be said to emerge (as by-products o f domain-general 
processes), though this particular process of emergence would be much more highly 
constrained, as in Bates and Goodman’s bubble analogy.
The beauty of the “implemented symbolic processing” account of past tense lies in 
the fact that a system of PDP modules of this nature mirrors the beauty of our biological 
endowment itself. For the past five decades, nativists have been approaching the problem 
incorrectly. Instead of pigeon-holing each seemingly unlearnable behavior or trait into a 
genetic substrate (e.g. genes that code for a “word=stem+affix” template, language genes, 
etc.), we need to approach the problem much more interactively. Human genomes have 
been forever evolving in cotijunction with structure already in the world, as a result, our
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genes specify only the minimal information required to ensure a given behavior. “The 
modest number of human genes means that we must look elsewhere for the mechanisms 
that generate the complexities inherent in human development” (Venter et al.. Science, 16 
Feb., 2001, p. 1346). The beauty of our boigenetic endowment is that it is subtle (i.e. 
“modest”). Genetic determinism, the claim that the most formative constraint on 
ontogenesis is the genome, in other words, that complex higher-level behaviors are 
predetermined, or “hard-wired” in the genome, is an untenable claim in light of modem 
findings in genetics (Venter et al., p. 1348).
Results of the Human Genome Project speak more to the emergentist account of 
indirect, conservative genetic interaction presented by Bates & Goodman and Elman 
(1999)—a complex synergy of gene-gene, gene-environment, gene-organism, and 
environment-organism interactions throughout ontogenesis. Entering the Human Genome 
Project, researchers originally predicted that they would find about 100,000 different 
genes, our complete biological endowment. Much to their surprise, they found about 
30,000, significantly fewer than the number of genes that make up a grain of rice*’. Each 
gene is dedicated to a multitude of functions (also refer to Greenspan, 1995), not just to a 
single domain, and genes get re-used in multiple gene-gene interactions (frequently dubbed 
“epistasis”). Nor do genes specify maximal structure (i.e. direct gene-behavior 
correspondences) when the need to is non-existent, that is, where our biological 
endowment of non-linguistic mechanisms and other complex interactions adequately
'’Refer to these addresses; www.nhgri.nih.gov (Human Genome Project site) and www.celera.com (Corporate 
Genome Project site). Also refer to Science, Februaiy 16, 2001 and Nature, February 15, 2001. For a 
layperson’s summary of related issues, refer to the AJissoulian, February 12, 2001, “Human genetic map
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handle the behavioral phenomena.
For language, we are getting increasingly closer to the view that maximal structure 
(e.g. language genes, UG genes) and domain-specific architecture are unnecessary in 
many domains of processing. As the list of general cognitive mechanisms used for 
language expands (e.g. MacWhinney et al., 1999), the need for direct innate architecture 
diminishes. Some innate architecture is required to overcome the induction problem, but 
whether or not this is domain-specific architecture remains to be seen. To date, there is no 
conclusive genetic or neurological evidence that the human genome codes for rigid 
domain-specificity (or “modularity” in the standard Fodorian sense) when it comes to 
“words” and “rules.” Specialization regions are the outcome, not the cause, of 
ontogenesis. Linguistic research needs to be methodical in discovering whether our ever 
expanding collocation of general cognitive mechanisms is sufficient to overcome the 
induction problem in particular domains. Only then can we be sure what belongs in 
grammar proper, or if there is anything there at all.
An alternative research program would be dedicated to the discovery of how 
associative memory, and its sub-layers, need to be constrained in order to overcome the 
induction problem, conceding that some innate constraints on general learning need to be 
posited, though much more indirect ones (see Elman, 1999). The empirical task for the 
future is to determine in which domains of inquiry less constrained connectionist networks 
are applicable (e.g. irregulars but not regulars in past tense morphology), as opposed those
smaller than expected,” by Robert S. Boyd.
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in which highly constrained PDPs are applicable (e.g. regulars but not irregulars). To 
adequately account for the origins of linguistic structure, we cannot stop at the conclusion 
that different domains seem to require different mechanisms. We must go further to 
explain how these mechanisms are biologically implemented at the lower level, where 
“linguistic intelligence” is implemented in domain-general architecture and local processes. 
Nature is thrifty. If a linguistic function can be accomplished by domain-general 
mechanisms, there is no need to waste precious resources in order to create a domain- 
specific one. A constraint free, open-ended memory runs flat into the induction problem, 
but an associative mechanism constrained by its own innate architecture and schedule of 
development—and by structure in the world—can clearly overcome this problem (especially 
if we build further constraints and sub-modules into the model to handle rigid rule-bound 
behavior in general).
9.0 A Comprehensive Approach to Language’s Emergence:
At different levels o f  analysis, both Bates/Goodman and Pinker provide accurate 
descriptions o f the way children come to perform complex grammatical operations. To 
provide an adequate and well-supported description of the rule-bound behavior underlying 
English regular past tense formation at the psychological level, we must appeal to some 
form of serial symbol processing, and abandon less constrained connectionist networks as 
inaccurate models. At the implementational level, though, there is no need to abandon 
connectionist descriptions. Rule-based learning has been successfully implemented in 
connectionist networks for the past two decades (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986;
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Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland & Hinton, 1986; Touretsky, 1986; Elman, 1999).
Rule-based operations (i.e. grammar) might very well seem like they are implemented in a
serial symbol processor from a higher-level perspective, but at the neural (or “abstract
neurological”) level actually be implemented in a connectionist network. Rumelhart and
McClelland have made it clear that “their own program is one addressed to the
microstructures o f cognition, and this seems to allow for the possibility that more
traditional cognitive models might characterize the macrostructure” (Bechtel 265).
It becomes important, then, to develop some way of relating the more abstract, 
cognitive-level theory to the underlying neurophysiology. More fundamentally, 
this relation is central to conceptions of the relation between mind and brain. It is 
therefore o f considerable importance to have an explicit theoretical framework for 
conceptualizing the exact nature of this relation. (R&M, 1988: 329)
Evidently, then, much of the criticism Pinker levels at Rumelhart and McClelland is mis­
directed, as both o f their accounts are necessary for a comprehensive description of past 
tense learning, one that includes descriptions at the micro- (implementational, 
neurological) and macro- (functional, psychological) levels. From a macro-level 
perspective, we have evidence of innately constrained domain-specific machinery at work, 
and built-in KOL undergirding acquisition. From a micro-level perspective, on the other 
hand, all we have are “dumb” statistical and mechanical procedures at work, and non- 
linguistic machinery used in linguistic (and perhaps other) domains.
Symbol processing is implemented in connectionist architecture, not the other way 
around, as Pinker & Prince argue (1988). If it were the other way around, our account 
would provide no adequate explanation as to how symbol processing is implemented at 
the lower level; but such an explanation is imperative (otherwise our higher-level theory
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might correspond to nothing physical in the world). This is clearly not a reductionist 
account o f the phenomena (though token physicalist). The integrity of each level of 
description needs to be preserved in a more comprehensive account. In the case of past 
tense formation, a certain quality of description is lost when we descend to the descriptive 
vocabulary of the lower level, from “knowledge of lexical root,” “knowledge of head,” 
“knowledge of lexical entry” to rudimentary cellular mechanics. We could not, in theory, 
build our psychological description solely from a neurological account of the phenomena. 
At some level of analysis, the seams of these two theories do not neatly overlap (at least 
isomorphically, or type physically; for fiirther discussion on the larger issue of non- 
reducibility o f psychology to neurology, see Fodor, 1974). By resisting the temptation to 
eliminate the higher-level description with one from the lower level, we have both theories 
with which to build a unified, comprehensive account. Thus, we should be careful not to 
collapse the two levels into one, as they are each necessary (though insufficient) in our 
comprehensive view. Although from a lower-level perspective, higher-level phenomena 
(e.g. rule application) may be mere by-products of lower-level processes, the lower level 
per se gives us an impoverished account.
If descriptions solely at the lower level run the risk of mis-characterizing higher- 
level grammatical operations, then likewise descriptions solely at the higher level might 
miss the possibility that rigid rule-bound behavior can, in fact, be implemented in highly 
constrained connectionist networks. Neural nets whose weights are pre-set, whose 
learning rule is strong enough, etc., exhibit highly constrained, rule-like, but nevertheless 
emergent behavior (in the sense that grammar is mediated by a mechanism that might
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otherwise subserve non-linguistic classes of stimuli, or by one that might subserve both 
classes o f stimuli). Pinker does not entertain this possibility because he draws his 
conclusions from observation of mostly higher level phenomena (e.g. the “wug test,” and 
other such psychological tests).
Insofar as the “emergence of grammar from the lexicon” is concerned, when we 
look at specific grammatical operations at the m ural level, this might simply mean is that 
grammar is mediated by a similar processor (similar to the one that mediates the lexicon), 
though one much more rigidly constrained. But clearly this is neither the strength nor 
variety of “emergence” that Bates and Goodman have in mind; for they want to say 
grammar is mediated by the same processor as the lexicon (i.e. the same set of nodes and 
connections). In this regard, the dual-mechanism account is essentially correct that there 
are separate mechanisms for words and rules, it is not necessarily correct, however, that at 
the neural level, one mechanism is a serial symbol processor, and the other a PDP. At the 
neural level, a serial symbol processor dedicated to language and only language is highly 
unlikely'*. A PDP type processor is far more reasonable because it follows principles of 
general cognition, plausible neurophysiological mechanisms to work (i.e. more
flexible categorization of stimuli and domain-general architecture). It is unclear what 
biological mechanisms (or “hardware”) would even be available for a lower-level 
explanation of past tense in classical serial symbol processing terms, especially in light of
**For a detailed summary of why serial symbol processors are unlikely at the iiiiplementatioiiai level, refer to 
Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988: 335-7. Three of the reasons included therewith are the “ 100 step constraint” 
(=>SSPs too slow for brain-style computation), acute sensativity to damage and noise (=>SSPs suffer 
catastrophic damage, whereas brains usually undergo reorganization), and lastly, rigidity (=>rules governing 
SSPs lack adequate flexibility).
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the domain-specificity claim. Thus, Pinker’s description of past tense formation at the 
psychological level is fairly exact-for both regulars and irregulars; at the neural level, by 
contrast, he offers a fairly exact description of irregular formation, but only an 
approximate description of regular formation.
At the neural level, the general type of mechanism that Bates and Goodman 
propose for grammar is perfectly permissible (but note that this is not such a radical claim 
now). At the psychological level, however, appealing to less constrained versions of this 
same mechanism leads to inadequate descriptions of particular grammatical phenomena. 
The question of which grammatical operations prove to be more rigidly constrained (and 
how \ as opposed to those which prove to be motivated by less constrained associative 
devices, is essentially an open-ended empirical matter, a puzzle for linguistics of the 21st 
century.
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Figure 1: Chomsky & Halle (1968)
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Figure 4:
(from Pinker, 1999: 130)
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Figure 6;
(from Pinker, 1999; 23) 19
M outh and Ears
Phonolow 
(rules that define 
the sound pattern 
of a language)
Semantics 
(meanings expressed 
through language)
/ \
Lexicon 
(stored entries 
for words, 
including irregulars)
—
Morphology 
(rules ror forming 
complex words, 
including regulars)
Syntax 
(rules for 
forming phrases 
and sentences)
\ 1 /
Beliefs and Desires
19The only difference between Pinker’s sketch of the linguistic system and Chomsk}' & Halle’s ( 1968) is the 
inclusion of irregular past tense forms in the lexicon. Chomsky & Haile would only include minimal structure 
in the lexicon for irregulars, so only the root form plus an appropriate change “tag” would be stored.
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Figure 7:
Which Mechanism Accomplishes What—
IRREGULARS REGULARS GENERALIZATION
C/H(1968): G G G
R/M (1988): L L L
P/M (1993): L L/?* IV?*
D/S (1994): L L L
P (1999): L G L
♦The “?” symbol means there is some discrepancy. P/M “patch in” regular suffixes to the output 
units, so the same weights that compute irregulars do not necessarily generate regular past tenses: 
this can happen in the absence of a found irregular “closest match.” Also, generalization of the 
“-ed” suffix to novel stems may fall out of the same process—the absence of a “closest match.”
Facts to be accountedfor—
(adequate accounts get a “$” symbol, otherwise “X”)
REG. ERRORS (selective) IRR. ERRORS (s.) REG BUT INCONS.
C/H: X X X
R/M: X X X
P/M: X $ $
D/S: X $ $
P: $ $ X
C/H and R/M can only account for macro u*shaped learning, but not micro. P/M & D/S
cannot account for regularization errors because candidate verbs may have little phonological 
similarity to patterns in memory; but this is really the only basis for generalizing the “-ed” suffix, 
unless we rely on the regular pattern being the most robust pattern in memory (which it is not cross- 
culturally). Pinker can deal with this problem because he distinguishes between regularity based on 
frequency and psychological regularitj', the later of which acts as the default rule. Nevertheless, 
Pinker cannot account for the regular but inconsistent class (see "A Convergent Model” section).
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(from R&M, 1986; 263-4)
Table 1:
THE MODEL S RESPONSES TO UNFAMILIAR 
LOW-FREQUENCY IRREGULAR VERBS
Verb presented Phonetic Phonetic English Response
Type Word Input Response Rendition Strength
1 bid /b id / /b id / (bid) 0.55
thrust h r '  S t / / T r ' s f d / (ihrusted) 0.57
11 bend /b e n d / / b e n d 'd / (bended) 0.28
lend / le n d / / l e n d 'd / ((ended) 0.70
(II creep /krEp/ /krEpt/ (creeped) 0 51
weep /wEp/ /wEpi/ (weeped) 0.J4
/w ept/ (wept) 0.33
IV catch /k a c / /k a c t / (catched) 0.67
V breed /brEd/ /b rE d 'd / (breeded) 0.48
grind /grind/ /grind / (grind) 0.44
wind /w ind/ /w ind / (wind) 0.37
VI cling /kliN,' /k l ivd / (dinged) 0.28
/k l 'N / (clung) ()23
dig /d ig / /d igd / (digged) 0.22
Slick /s iik / /s t ik t/ (sucked) 0.53
VII tear / te r / / te rd / beared) 0.90
97
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 2:
SYSTEM RESPONSES TO UNFAMILIAR LOW-FREQUENCY REGULAR VERBS
Verb Presented Phonetic Phonetic Engli.sh Response
Type Word Input Response Rendition Rendition
End in guard /gurrd/ / g u r d / 1 guard) Q.29
lid /giitrd'd/ (guarded) 0.26
kid /kid/ /k id / (kid) 0.39
/ k i d 'd / (kidded) 0.24
mate /m A t/ /m A t 'd / (mated) 043
/ r o A d ' d / (maded) 0.23
squat / s k w ' t / /sk w * t 'd / (squated) 0.27
/ s k w ' t / (squat) 0.22
/sk w ’kt/ (squawked) 0.21
End in carp /k u t rp / / k u r p t / (carped) (L28
unvoiced / k a r p i ' d / (carpted) 0.21
consonant drip /d r ip / /d r ip t 'd / (dripted) 028
/dr ip i / (dripped) 0.22
map / m a p / /m a p t 'd / (mapted) 0.24
/m ap t / (mapped) 0.22
shape / sap/ /SAPt/ (shaped) 0.43
/sip t/  • (shipped) 0.27
sip /s ip / /s ipt/ (sipped) 0.42
/sep t/ (sapped) 0.28
slip /s l ip / /slept/ (slept) 0.40
smoke /sm O k / / s m O k i 'd / (smokted) 0.29
/sm O k/ (smoke) 0.22
snap /s n a p / /s n a p t 'd / (snaptedl 0.40
step /s te p / / s te p t 'd / (stepted) 0.59
type / u p / / t ip t 'd / (typted) 0.33
End in brown /b rw n / /brw nd/ (browned) 0.46
voiced /b r 'n d / (brawned) 0.39
consonant hug /h'g/ /h'g/ (hug) 0.59
or vowel
mail /  m A ' I / ZmA'Id/ (mailed) 033
/m e m b ' ld / (membled) 0,23
tour /tur/ / t c f d ' r / (toureder) 0,31
/ tu rd / (toured) 0.25
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English Irregular & Regular Past Tense
(from Bybee & Slobin, 1982)
Irregular:
I. No Change: beat, hit, cut 
n  Stem-final /d/~>/t/: send/sent, build/built
n i .  Internal Vowel Change (JVC) + stem-final /d / or/t/: feel/felt, lose/lost, say/said, 
tell/told
rV. JVC, delete stem-fmal consonant (C), + stem-final /d / or /t/: bring/brought, 
catch/caught
V. JVC where stem-final C [+dental]: bite/bit, find/found, ride/rode
Via. VC /i/—>/a/: sing/sang, drink/drank
VIb. JVC /// or /a / —> C/: sting/stung, hang/hung
VII. All other IVCs: give/gave, break/broke
Vni. VC where stem-final diphthong: blow/blew, fly/flew
Regular:
I. Add/-Id/where stem-final C [^dental]: start/started
n. Add/-t/where stem-final C [-voice]: look/looked
ITT Add/-d/where stem-final V, or C [+voice]: move/moved
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